Capability Is Not Propensity: Measuring Pressure-Robust Cooperative Behavior in Civic LLM Agents

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in group decision-making with other LLMs and humans. Yet it remains unclear whether their influence is driven by persuasion-oriented expression or compliance-oriented accommodation. We introduce DecisionQE, a questionnaire-based framework for measuring each model's persuasive and compliant tendencies across multiple decision scenarios, and use the Werewolf game as an interactive testbed to study their effects on social influence and group outcomes under asymmetric information. Across experiments, stronger persuasive tendency does not significantly improve group outcomes, whereas compliant-oriented models show more stable advantages in cooperation. We further reveal a dual effect of compliance: it supports cooperation in honest roles but improves concealment in adversarial roles. These findings suggest that LLM group interactions reveal not only task outcomes, but also measurable patterns of intrinsic behavioral tendency. LLMs can therefore serve as a lens for sociological observation of language-mediated interaction, while highlighting the need to incorporate behavioral tendencies into safety evaluation of LLM systems.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents in equilibrium. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become more effective under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Recent advances in language models have enabled collaborative settings in which multiple models leverage one another's capabilities, iteratively improving, transforming, and extending each other's outputs. Each agent sees what the others assert before it answers, so peer opinion competes with the model's own parametric knowledge, and a wrong majority can overturn an answer the model would otherwise get right. We measure that displacement in 23 open-weight models, 19 conditions, and three datasets, yielding more than a million graded responses. A unanimous wrong majority reverses 22.8% of a model's correct MMLU answers, 54.8% on GPQA and 71.0% on SimpleQA, and 84-89% of the reversed answers match the peers' answers. Existing mitigations aim to increase Resistance, the rate at which a model keeps its correct answer under this pressure, which is only half of what a collaborating agent needs. We pair it with Receptivity, the rate at which a model adopts a correct peer answer after initially answering incorrectly. We score six methods on both axes, four drawn from prior work and two of our own. Each gains Resistance only by losing Receptivity, and their means fall on a single Resistance-Receptivity frontier with $R^2$ between 0.80 and 0.90. Reflection, the strongest published method, gains 7.9 points of MMLU Resistance and gives up 15.3 of Receptivity. Reasoning is the one exception. On GPQA and SimpleQA it trades like the rest, but on the MMLU subjects whose answers a model can derive for itself it raises Resistance by 7.2 points and Receptivity by 9.6 at once, the only intervention we find that improves both.