Improving reasoning LLMs requires the ability to judge the quality of long reasoning traces for effective reasoning data curation, strong training signals during reinforcement learning, and an in-depth understanding of reasoning behaviors during model performance evaluation. Additionally, surfacing reasoning mistakes that the model makes would enable improving the model's performance at runtime through providing feedback. Due to the difficulty of this complex task on long reasoning traces, single-model judges (even frontier models) do not do well at identifying reasoning defects. Additionally, leveraging frontier models during online training of reasoning LLMs is generally prohibited due to guardrails in terms of use. In this work, we introduce Reasoning Jury, a system that replaces the single judge with a jury of LLMs and a moderated consensus mechanism, to improve the fidelity of judgments for identifying reasoning defects. In reasoning jury, defects of a reasoning trace and their severity are surfaced through a deliberation where a moderator conducts a discussion amongst the jury where the jurors critique each other's judgments and get to modify their initial votes. The moderator derives a consensus through deliberation amongst jurors or consolidation of judgements. We show that Reasoning Jury with a jury of open-weight models (e.g., gpt-oss-120b) is able to significantly outperform frontier models (opus-4.6, sonnet-4.6, and gemini-3.1-pro) at correctly identifying reasoning defects. Besides accuracy performance improvements, the aggregated cost of the jury (initial verdicts, deliberations, consolidation, etc.) is a fraction (8 to 15%) of the cost of running frontier models in LLM-as-a-judge setup. We also show how these judgements can be leveraged to understand failure modes of reasoning LLMs on benchmarks, which allows much deeper understanding of a model's performance.
Selecting the correct answer from a pool of candidate reasoning chains is the engine of test-time scaling, yet the standard selectors each carry a cost: self-consistency inherits the errors of the single model it resamples, and trained reward models need labeled data and transfer poorly off-distribution. We study a third signal, free at inference time: cross-model consensus, the degree to which independently trained models, each solving the problem once, agree on a final answer. We treat the panel as an LLM-jury, in which the structure of agreement, not any model's score of another, is the verification signal. Across seven benchmarks it selects correct answers better than self-consistency and far better than a model scoring its own candidates: on competition math it closes the entire gap to an oracle selector, while self-scoring closes almost none. The mechanism is error decorrelation: independently trained models err differently, so their wrong answers scatter while the correct one accumulates agreement. We make this precise with a parameter-free law, derived in closed form, that predicts consensus accuracy from three measured panel statistics to a mean absolute error of 0.03 and exposes the method's ceiling: a shared-error floor where models share a misconception, near zero on math but non-trivial on science. Against four trained verifiers spanning discriminative, outcome, and generative reward models, the free LLM-jury matches the strongest inside their math training domain and is the top selector outside it. Cross-model consensus is thus a verifier we can characterize in advance: a law that says when to trust it, and a floor that marks where it cannot.
Should we trust Large Language Models (LLMs) with high accuracy? LLMs achieve high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks, but correctness alone does not reveal the quality of the reasoning used to produce it. This highlights a fundamental limitation of outcome-based evaluation: models may arrive at correct answers through flawed reasoning, and models with substantially different reasoning capabilities can nevertheless exhibit similar benchmark accuracy, for example due to memorization or over-optimization. In this paper, we ask: given existing benchmarks, can we move beyond outcome-based evaluation to assess the quality of reasoning itself? We seek metrics that (1) differentiate models with similar accuracy and (2) are robust to variations in input prompts and generation configurations. To this end, we propose a reasoning score that evaluates reasoning traces along dimensions such as faithfulness, coherence, utility, and factuality. A remaining question is how to aggregate this score across multiple sampled traces. Naively averaging them is undesirable, particularly in long-horizon settings, where the number of possible trajectories grows rapidly, and low-confidence correct traces are more likely to be coincidental. To address this, we introduce the Filtered Reasoning Score (FRS), which computes reasoning quality using only the top-K% most confident traces. Evaluating with FRS, models that are indistinguishable under standard accuracy exhibit significant differences in reasoning quality. Moreover, models with higher FRS on one benchmark tend to perform better on other reasoning benchmarks, in both accuracy and reasoning quality. Together, these findings suggest that FRS complements accuracy by capturing a model's transferable reasoning capabilities. We open source our evaluation codebase: https://github.com/Manas2006/benchmark_reproducibility.
Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly used for various tasks, often coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting to boost accuracy. Recent work has shown that high label-prediction accuracy does not guarantee correct intermediate reasoning, and the causes of reasoning flaws vary from sample to sample, yet existing remedies either focus on a single domain or assume that one flaw type applies uniformly across samples. A simple mitigation method is to provide the model with the correct answer, but we show that this yields no consistent improvement in reasoning quality. This indicates that the problem cannot be fixed by LLMs' awareness of answers, and must instead be addressed through the structure of reasoning. Motivated by this, we propose CRAFT (Consensus Reasoning-knowledge-graph Aggregation for Flaw-aware Trace synthesis), which aggregates the consensus components shared across multiple candidate reasoning traces to synthesize improved ones. CRAFT consistently improves label-prediction accuracy on both logical and mathematical reasoning benchmarks, outperforming most baselines, while its post-processed traces achieve higher quality under fine-grained benchmark evaluation.