Dead text or binding clause? Measuring and restoring constraint influence in black-box LLM dialogues

Haoyuan Zhu

cs.AIAug 12, 2026

Dead text or binding clause? Measuring and restoring constraint influence in black-box LLM dialogues

Authors: Haoyuan Zhu

Organizations: Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering University of Sheffield

Abstract

Multi-turn dialogues let users revoke constraints as easily as impose them, but revocation does not reliably take effect: models keep enacting withdrawn requirements (occasionally beneath comments asserting their removal), a failure we call \emph{behavioral relapse}, or revocation inertia. No existing instrument measures this influence per clause, predicts it before delivery, or repairs it under matched budgets. \sysname{} closes the three gaps through the model API alone: a contract ledger pairs every constraint with an executable checker, records revocations as tombstones, and compiles the net constraint state ahead of time into a single specification; a sequential ablation probe measures per-clause adherence and incremental behavioral effect; a repair ladder operates under token- and attempt-matched budgets. On \dataname{} (\NTasks{} HumanEval tasks, \NClauses{} verified checkers), relapse at an 8B operating point climbs from \ScaleDelayedMTwo{} to \ScaleDelayedMEight{} as constraint load grows, while stronger models sit at floor. Under matched checkers, model, and budget, ahead-of-time compilation significantly reduces relapse against a no-ledger verifier-retry baseline (\RestoreDiff{}, 95% CI \RestoreDiffCI{}, $p$ \RestoreDiffP{}); adaptive ladder interventions stacked on top add no detectable gain (95% confidence excludes gains $\geq$ \LadderExcludedGain{}). The probe predicts relapse before delivery (AUROC \AurocPrimary{}); a one-sentence tombstone note recovers about a third of the compilation effect and survives a placebo control. At \CostDeliveryFactor{} delivery overhead and \CostTotalHedged{} of API compute for every result, revocation failure becomes a measurable, predictable, and repairable property of dialogue state rather than an invisible one.

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