Where Cognition Lives: Dissecting Emergent from Computed Function in a Minimal Complete Cognitive Architecture

Cognitive science remains split between cognitivism - which accounts for recursion and language but cannot ground formal symbols in meaning - and 4E approaches - which ground cognition in the body but rarely specify the body's architecture in enough detail to support generativity. We argue the impasse stems from an incomplete account of the embodied agent's architecture, and propose one: the Sensation Modulating Network (SMN), the cognitive agent conceived as the whole body, organized at every anatomical scale by opponent dynamics, built from Sensation Modulators that sense and act through one substrate, paired into Coordinated Action Zones routed by a body-wide broadcast network. Three commitments give the SMN its purchase. Haltability - the recruitment of antagonistic affordance into co-activated equilibrium - provides the architectural locus that object-directed phenomenology, in Husserl's sense, requires: opponency enables co-activation, co-activation enables halt, halt enables attention, attention enables intentional directedness, with no module added on top. The dual-signal property of self-modulatable action patterns (SMAPs) makes the self/world distinction a structural feature of the wiring rather than a category the agent applies. And a four-level action-pattern hierarchy - Basal, Haltable, Negotiable, Transactional - gives a single trajectory from autonomic regularity to public conventionalization, locating the conditions for grammar-grounded generativity as architectural transitions. The SMN reconciles the cognitivism-4E debate: recursion lives in the modifiable dynamics of Negotiable Action Patterns, embodiment in the opponent substrate that supports them. A tentative formalism and eight predicted registers (seven testable, one hypothetical), with reference simulations, are given in an appendix.

Memory, planning, reflection, and tool use are often compared as feature labels, obscuring the control semantics that determine how an agent actually runs. This review connects ten historical cognitive architectures, eight language-agent runtime families, and forty-two mechanism-focused modern systems. We reconstruct each mechanism through state, control, transition, persistence, failure, learning, and resource governance, then code evidence relation (E1-E4) separately from migration depth (D0-D4). The resulting landscape is uneven. Modern agents have operationalized substantial parts of adaptive memory, failure recovery, dynamic team selection, workflow search, skill induction, resource scheduling, and uncertainty-conditioned action, although often through independent convergence rather than documented inheritance. The strongest remaining opportunities lie in couplings among mechanisms. Closest-baseline screening closes one proposed gap: GraSP already combines calibrated multi-skill selection, typed compilation, verification, bounded repair, and replanning or ReAct fallback. Five residual bundles remain: activation with latency and action utility; typed impasse with isolated substates and resolution compilation; bounded content competition with broadcast and admission learning; persistent intention with reconsideration and live method authority; and uncertainty with resource allocation, interruption, and stopping. We contribute a distinctive-mechanism catalog, an auditable evidence-depth framework, and a falsifiable agenda for testing these bundles as composable runtime invariants.

An agent must act on the situation before it, learn what it cannot yet represent, and model other agents well enough to coordinate. These faculties are usually realized by separate mechanisms, yet they share a failure mode: the situation can exceed what the agent can currently represent, and the honest response is then a principled refusal that says what was missing. We develop a small cognitive architecture in which these limits arise from a single quantity. An Interpretation-Decision Unit (IDU) interprets a content vector through a family of regimes - local representational frames with private bases - and decides which actions it licenses; a scalar residual of the content against the active regimes' representational scope drives the unit. Low residual with a clean licensing emits an action; otherwise the unit re-interprets, attempts a description-length-justified expansion, or halts with a typed, witnessed terminal. We prove the unit is total and deterministic: for any content and fixed configuration it halts in finitely many bounded-cost steps with a unique terminal witness, so abstention carries its cause by construction. By binding the architecture's open parameters without changing its mechanics, the same residual-against-scope constraint recovers three documented phenomena at three scopes: the typology of not-knowing (typed abstention); a forced misunderstanding between agents, localized to one shared concept and invisible to the agent committing it (bounded empathy); and prerequisite dependence in learning derived from a bounded focus window rather than posited (developmental prerequisites). Each instantiation is worked for a natural and an artificial agent and states a falsifiable prediction, so one constraint can model limits in both human and machine cognition. The account contributes a unification and a notion of accountable abstention, typed and witnessed by construction.