A Geometric Theory of Robust Fairness Audits

Fairness audits are increasingly mandated in high-stakes applications such as hiring, lending, and automated decision-making. Recent work has established fundamental impossibility results for black-box fairness auditing, showing that sufficiently expressive models can evade any auditing strategy. We complement these results by quantifying the extent of unavoidable post-audit manipulation under finite audit resources. We formulate fairness auditing as a min-max optimization between a computationally unbounded company and a budget-constrained auditor. We study two auditing regimes: (i) a budgeted auditor that certifies fairness using a fixed-size audit set, and (ii) a budgeted α-tolerant auditor that additionally requires the audit set to estimate the fairness of the certified model within an α approximation. For both settings, we derive explicit lower bounds on the worst-case post-audit demographic parity deviation as functions of the audit budget, group imbalance, and fairness tolerance. Finally, we empirically illustrate these theoretical limits using simple audit-set construction heuristics with linear and neural network classifiers. Our results demonstrate that increasing audit resources reduces, but does not eliminate, the scope for post-audit manipulation, highlighting fundamental limitations of finite-budget fairness certification.

External evaluations are becoming increasingly central to the governance of AI systems. In practice, however, independent auditors often have limited access to deployed models and must rely on query-based interactions. Most existing fairness evaluation methods assume static datasets and fixed-sample statistical tests, making them poorly suited to real-world auditing scenarios in which evidence must be collected sequentially under query constraints. In this work, we formulate fairness auditing as a tolerance-aware sequential hypothesis-testing problem under limited model output access. We develop a sequential generalized likelihood-ratio framework that allows auditors to accumulate evidence from a finite audit pool and stop once sufficient support for compliance or violation has been obtained. The framework is instantiated for decision-based Statistical Parity and Equal Opportunity audits, and extended to score- and logit-based proxy audits when richer observables are available. Our results show that both the fairness metric and the level of model access significantly affect audit efficiency, and that the benefits of richer output information are not uniform across auditing settings. In particular, richer outputs can substantially reduce the number of queries required for some fairness metrics and operating regimes, while offering limited gains in near-threshold cases. This work provides a practical statistical framework for sequential fairness auditing under realistic deployment constraints.

As artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed, algorithmic unfairness has raised growing concerns and intensified demands for transparent fairness auditing. In practice, the tolerable degree of algorithmic unfairness depends on the specific legal, ethical, or application context. Given a prespecified tolerance threshold, an important statistical question is how to determine whether a group disparity exceeds the allowable tolerance across different auditing objectives. To address this problem, we develop a unified tolerance-based fairness auditing framework for two complementary auditing objectives: violation certification, which prioritizes control of false violation declarations, and sensitivity screening, which prioritizes reducing missed violations. For the first objective, we develop a constrained empirical likelihood test for formal settings that uses least-favorable-point calibration and can be combined with false flagging rate control for simultaneous subgroup auditing. For the second objective, we develop split empirical likelihood and adjusted split empirical likelihood tests using an adaptive boundary-proxy principle for early-warning settings. Numerical experiments show the distinct error-control--sensitivity trade-offs of these procedures. A COMPAS analysis illustrates the framework in predictive fairness auditing.