Social media platforms increasingly use AI-based credibility indicators to help users judge misinformation. Unlike individual human-AI decision-making, these indicators are embedded in information spread: users see both an AI prediction and earlier judgments shaped by the same AI, and their own judgments may then enter the public history. Yet how to analytically characterize this process remains under-explored. We therefore introduce a social-learning lens for this setting by extending the classical Bayesian cascade model with the AI indicator as a shared public signal. The resulting Gateway condition compares the evidence from the AI prediction with users' private impressions. Through this view, we show that AI changes what public history means. Crowd agreement may reflect accumulated independent human evidence, or repeated dependence on the same AI prediction. This creates a preservation-correction trade-off: stronger reliance on AI can preserve correct predictions, but can also lock in incorrect ones by blocking corrective private impressions. We calibrate the model using human-subject data on news veracity judgments. Although the AI outperforms human users, the average user weights it below her own impression but above several peer judgments, while individual users vary from discounting the AI to relying on it enough to cascade. Simulations show that over-reliance on a weak AI is especially harmful, and that diversifying AI signals across users can better keep the crowd informative. We conclude with implications for understanding human-AI interaction in information spread and designing misinformation interventions.
Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.
Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.
Thomas H. Costello, Kellin Pelrine, Matthew Kowal +6
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into the online platforms where humans exchange opinions; large language models (LLMs) now polish users' posts on LinkedIn and provide context for content shared on X. While prior work has shown that AI can express biased opinions and shape individuals' opinions during human-AI interactions, less attention has been paid to its influence on collective opinion formation when mediating human-to-human communication. We address this gap via a combination of empirical and theoretical analyses. We show empirically that LLMs from multiple popular families introduce directional biases when instructed to edit human-written texts on contested topics, for example, nudging texts in favor of gun control and against atheism. Building on this observation, we introduce a mathematical model of opinion dynamics in which an AI system sits between users on a social network, transforming the opinions they express and perceive. By analytically characterizing the equilibrium of this model and performing simulations on real social network data, we show that biases introduced by AI in human-to-human communication can be amplified through the network and shift collective opinion in their direction. In light of these findings, we investigate whether such biases are controllable by online platforms. We audit the "Explain this post" feature on X and find evidence of pro-life bias in Grok's outputs on abortion-related content, which we trace back to specific design choices. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings in relation to ongoing legislative efforts in the European Union.