cs.CLAug 31, 2026

Lies We Can See: Joint Verbal and Non-Verbal Deception by VLM Agents in Embodied Social Interactions

Authors: Jaewoo AhnJunseo KimHyunseo KimHeeseung YunJaehyeon SonZsolt KiraGunhee Kim

Organizations: Seoul National University · Inha University · KAIST · Georgia Institute of Technology

Abstract

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that VLM agents pursue imposter wins through joint verbal and non-verbal deception, with non-verbal channels emerging as the more decisive winning contributors across both harness ablation and cross-VLM evaluation. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

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