Auditing Harness Tampering in Self-Improving Agents
Organizations: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Abstract
Self-improving agents iteratively modify their own harness to push the frontier of their performance. However, such modifications can produce illusory performance gains or compromise integrity constraints such as authorization, provenance, and completeness without genuinely improving capability. We term this phenomenon as harness tampering, which extends the concept from reward and measurement tampering to the full self-improvement lifecycle. To systematically study this problem, we propose a two-axis taxonomy that categorizes each misaligned edit by the harness functional role in which it occurs and the obligation it violates. Then we build an annotated corpus by seeding tampered-benign edit pairs into the real trajectories of self-improving agents. We adapt and benchmark diverse audit methods on tampering classification and localization tasks. Finally we systematically audit real trajectories of self-improving agents. The results demonstrate that harness tampering consistently occurs in real runs from different agents, often persists in the lineage of the best agent, and forms distinct system-specific profiles across the taxonomy.
Figures & tables
| Obligation | Definition | Conceptual basis |
|---|---|---|
| Measurement validity | Whether a measurement supports the stated inference about its named target. | Validity theory ( Kane 2013 ) ; reward and measurement tampering ( Everitt et al. 2021 ; Roger et al. 2023 ) . |
| Representational fidelity | Whether an output or record matches the event, value, state, or decision it represents. | Falsified verdicts and workflow records ( Wang et al. 2026a ; Thaman 2026 ) . |
| Procedural integrity | Whether an edit follows procedure that governs its computation, transformation, or decision. | Integrity models ( Clark and Wilson 1987 ) ; evaluator modification ( Atinafu and Cohen 2026 ) . |
| Authorization and access boundaries | Whether an action and the resources it reaches remain within the permitted boundary. | Protection principles ( Saltzer and Schroeder 1975 ) ; held-out-data access ( Atinafu and Cohen 2026 ) . |
| Protected artifact and state integrity | Whether a protected object retains its required identity, contents, or validity. | Information integrity ( Clark and Wilson 1987 ) ; reward-code, guard-test, and protected-file modification ( Denison et al. 2024 ; Thaman 2026 ) . |
| Provenance and source attribution | Whether an item is associated with the correct producer, variant, run, source, and version. | Data provenance ( Buneman et al. 2001 ) ; fabricated reward records ( Wang et al. 2026a ) . |
| Classification | Localization | |||||||||
| Auditor | Acc. | F1 | Func. | Oblig. | Cost ($) | Rec. | FPR | Func. | Oblig. | Cost ($) |
| Random | 49.6 | 51.0 | 10.7 | 0 8.0 | n/a | 0 7.6 | 0 8.5 | 0 1.3 | 0 1.0 | 00 n/a |
| Prompted auditors | ||||||||||
| Qwen 3.5 9B | 53.7 | 43.8 | 0 6.4 | 11.1 | 00 1.7 | 48.2 | 35.2 | 0 7.8 | 13.6 | 00 3.6 |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash | 56.0 | 30.1 | 11.9 | 10.1 | 00 9.9 | 24.8 | 0 0.2 | 15.2 | 16.4 | 0 14.7 |
| Grok 4.6 | 83.6 | 82.9 | 43.8 | 42.0 | 0 51.8 | 59.8 | 0 3.2 | 35.0 | 40.1 | 120.4 |
| System | Tampering Rate | Avg. Findings |
|---|---|---|
| ADAS | 84.6% | 1.12 |
| AFlow | 18.3% | 0.18 |
| DGM | 63.1% | 1.18 |
| HyperAgents | 73.6% | 0.94 |
| ScientistOne | 29.6% | 0.31 |
AI Agent Auditing
AI agent auditing examines agents’ actions, tool use, evidence, and outcomes to assess safety, compliance, reliability, and accountability.
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