Toward Collective-Centric Evaluation of Preference Inference for Participatory Democracy
Authors: Pierre-Antoine Lequeu, Salim Hafid, Paul Lerner, Nazanin Shafiabadi, Laurène Cave, David Mas, Jean-Philippe Cointet, Benjamin Piwowarski, +1 more
To scale up collective decision-making, participatory democracy platforms such as Polis and Remesh enable online deliberation among thousands of participants. However, at this scale, participants cannot review every opinion submitted by others, producing highly sparse voting data that misrepresent patterns of consensus, conflict, and minority support. Platforms therefore increasingly rely on Preference Inference (PI) models to predict missing votes. Yet this automation is not neutral: inferred preferences can artificially amplify, suppress, or reorder existing patterns of support, ultimately reshaping how the outcomes of a deliberation are interpreted. More generally, we lack a systematic understanding of how existing PI methods affect the collective preference landscape. To address this gap, we benchmark several existing PI approaches in this context. Moving beyond conventional user-centric evaluations centered on the accuracy of individual predictions, we introduce a collective-centric evaluation framework that measures whether inferred votes preserve salient properties of the broader preference landscape. We further contribute the largest multilingual dataset of its kind: four consultations spanning over 90k participants, 1M votes, and 22 languages. Our experiments show that models with comparable predictive accuracy can differ substantially in the degree to which they preserve the collective structure. These results demonstrate that accuracy alone is insufficient for evaluating PI in democratic settings. By contributing a novel comprehensive and collective-centric evaluation benchmark for the task of PI, this work aims to support the development of AI systems that scale deliberation without compromising the integrity of its democratic outcomes.
Modern AI is opening the door to collective decision-making in which participants express their views as free-form text rather than voting on a fixed set of candidates. A natural idea is to embed these opinions in a vector space so that the substantial literature on facility location problems and fair clustering can be brought to bear. But standard text embeddings measure semantic similarity, whereas distances in facility location problems and fair clustering require what we call \textit{preferential similarity}: a participant's agreement with a piece of text should be inversely related to their distance from it. Off-the-shelf embeddings inherit a coarse preference signal through a correlation between semantic and preferential similarity, but fail to capture preferences when the correlation breaks. We formalize this as an invariance problem: text embedding models encode both a preference-relevant signal (stance and values) and semantic nuisance (style and wording), and the two are observationally correlated, so a geometry that relies on nuisance can appear preference-correct even when it is not. We show that synthetic training data designed to break this correlation provably shifts the optimal scorer away from nuisance-dominated cosine and significantly improves preference prediction across 11 online deliberation datasets.
Preference-based alignment often struggles to capture the reasoning that underlies human judgments. Many evaluations rely on multiple interacting criteria, yet pairwise labels reveal only the final choice rather than the considerations that shape preferences. Inverse Constitutional AI (ICAI) improves interpretability in decision making by summarizing preferences into natural-language principles, but its single-pass explanations miss much of the nuance involved in complex decisions. We introduce Democratic ICAI (DICAI), a novel approach that gathers multiple competing rationales through structured persona debate, offering a broader and more expressive account of the factors influencing each comparison. From these richer signals, we derive clearer and more comprehensive steering principles and use them to guide preference decision modeling through both LLM-based and decision-tree judges, as well as downstream model training via constitution-induced preference labels. Experiments on creative preference benchmarks, MuCE-Pref and LiTBench, across multiple creative task categories show that Democratic ICAI yields a more faithful preference structure. It improves average preference prediction across tasks relative to deliberative prompting and principle-based baselines, while producing constitutions that LLM annotators prefer.
Local pairwise comparisons are a standard tool for learning how people want decision rules to work, e.g., in participatory design or alignment. However, their use builds in two strong assumptions: that local comparisons are sufficient evidence about how a person wants an automated decision rule to behave, and that people can always answer those comparisons decisively. We investigate how these assumptions may be compromised under internal pluralism: the idea that an individual evaluates decision rules according to multiple authoritative priorities about how the rule should behave. We provide a formal model of such pluralistic preferences over decision rules, which then lets us identify two distinct failures of forced local pairwise comparison data. First, priorities such as proportionality, egalitarianism, and equal treatment are inherently global: what they imply in one case can depend on what happens elsewhere, so local comparisons may fail to capture them. Second, even when priorities are representable locally, tension between strongly-held priorities can generate internal conflict, producing potentially costly behavioral distortions when comparisons are forced. We then use our model to investigate the alternative -- allowing people to report indecision -- and our findings suggest that doing so can considerably reduce the number of queries needed to learn preferences accurately. We conclude by describing how our model points toward preference-learning methods that elicit these priorities directly, yielding more faithful and interpretable accounts of what people value.