From Language Models to World-Acting Systems: Progress and Limits of Agentic AI across Digital, Social, Virtual, and Physical Environments
Abstract
Large language models become consequential agents when surrounding systems let outputs change external state. Models now call tools, operate interfaces, delegate work, retain state, inhabit generated worlds, and control robots or laboratory equipment. Such advances are often narrated as one march toward autonomy, conflating model competence, system integration, persistence, and safe authority. This critical review synthesizes primary research and official technical specifications available by 31 August 2026. We organize the evidence along delegated authority, temporal persistence, and environmental coupling, while separating model, harness, and environment. Within the evidence examined, action-interface expansion is documented more convincingly than robust completion, recovery, authorization, or independent verification. Model Context Protocol and Agent2Agent improve interoperability but do not establish trustworthy delegation; multi-agent organization adds specialization alongside cost and correlated failure. Persistent simulations and world models support training and planning but do not themselves demonstrate agency; robotics and self-driving laboratories establish bounded feasibility rather than unattended open-world reliability. We propose justified delegation as an analytical and normative heuristic, not an observed law or certified score: expand action scope only where evidence supports provenance, bounded authority, failure detection, safe recovery, and calibrated human control. This framing yields a research agenda for coupled model-harness evaluation, capability-based permissions, durable state, cross-agent accountability, and staged physical validation.
Figures & tables
| Source category | Strongest defensible use | Typical blind spot | Representative examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peer-reviewed benchmark or systems paper | Performance and failure under the published task, model, harness, budget, and evaluator | Distribution shift, live permissions, changing interfaces, and longitudinal incidents | WebArena, OSWorld, SWE-agent, -bench [ 56 , 50 , 51 , 52 ] |
| Peer-reviewed controlled physical experiment | Feasibility and measured behaviour in a disclosed apparatus and procedure | Scale, repeated unattended operation, rare hazards, and transfer to other instruments | RT-2, Coscientist, ChemCrow [ 57 , 8 , 9 ] |
| Preprint or institutional technical report | Timely architecture, released artifact, and provisional evaluation | Peer review, independent replication, stable model endpoints, and selective reporting | Voyager, V-JEPA 2, Gemini Robotics, Magentic-UI [ 47 , 6 , 12 , 24 ] |
| Open technical specification | Defined roles, messages, state transitions, discovery, and security requirements | Implementation quality, adoption, semantic correctness, and end-task reliability | MCP and A2A [ 22 , 1 ] |
| First-party preview, system card, or product record | Existence, stated design, first-party tests, deployment constraints, and disclosed failure modes | Independent replication, complete denominators, comparison fairness, and durability | OpenAI CUA, Genie 3, Project Eden, MHS [ 29 , 33 , 46 , 5 ] |
| Interface | Primary relationship | State / continuation | Human-control affordance | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MCP 2026-07-28 | AI host or client to tool/resource server | Stateless protocol core; explicit handles; task extension for long work | Multi-round-trip input or confirmation mediated by the client | Tool safety, least privilege, semantic success, or server trustworthiness [ 22 , 23 ] |
| A2A 1.0 | Client agent to remote, internally opaque agent | Stateful task lifecycle, context identifiers, artifacts, streaming and push | input-required , cancellation, authenticated task continuation | Benefit of multiple agents, truthful capability claims, or correctness of completed artifacts [ 1 ] |
| Human-centred agent UI | Human delegator to one or more software agents | Plans, parallel sessions, checkpoints, and optional memory | Co-planning, co-tasking, action approval, intervention, and final verification | That people notice every hazard, understand approvals, or can supervise at scale [ 24 ] |
| Physical driver layer | Agent or program to heterogeneous programmable devices | Device state, commands, streamed measurements, and reusable scripts | Hardware limits, allowlists, supervision, and escalation depend on implementation | Physical reasoning, calibrated sensing, general fault recovery, or unattended safety [ 5 ] |
| Environment | Typical evidence of success | Characteristic hidden state | Required control emphasis | Residual question |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tool/API sandbox | Returned object, state predicate, replayable trace | Service policy and effects outside the schema | Typed arguments, idempotency, allowlists, deterministic evaluators | Did the valid call satisfy the user’s actual intent? |
| Live web/desktop | Account state, receipt, artifact, independent query | Focus, overlays, remote policy, other users, indirect prompts | Isolated browser, credential scoping, confirmations, transaction reconciliation | What affected-party or account consequence was omitted? |
| Agent or human delegation | Signed artifact, task record, evidence package, acceptance decision | Contractor competence, incentives, private actions, copied context | Identity, bounded brief, budget, provenance, conflict and dispute mechanisms | Is “completion” truthful, lawful, and independently checkable? |
| Generated/simulated world | Instrumented state, causal probes, repeatable episode | Model shortcuts and mismatch with the target world | State access for evaluators, counterfactual tests, held-out dynamics, transfer validation | Did the agent learn the task or exploit the simulator? |
| Robot or laboratory | Independent sensors, calibrated measurement, physical inspection | Wear, contamination, occlusion, people, irreversible change | Interlocks, units, uncertainty, staged trials, emergency stop, expert accountability | Is failure bounded when the model or instrument is wrong? |
Agentic AI
Agentic artificial intelligence studies systems that plan, use tools, learn from feedback, and act toward goals with varying degrees of autonomy.
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