We introduce a probability-wave framework for modeling the collective behavior of interacting adaptive agents, deriving testable eigenmodes through a generalized behavioral intelligence (GBI) nonlocal probability-wave equation. This framework captures a broad range of human intelligence behaviors with analytical mechanisms and offers an indirect method to examine the Liu-Chen-Ao (LCA) hypothesis of nonlocal entangled nerve fibers in the brain through collective trader behaviors. Our empirical analysis of Chinese intraday stock market data demonstrates that adaptive entangled game modes explain 82-94% (89% overall) of observed decision patterns, a sharp contrast to the predictions of neoclassical finance based on independent rational agents. Moreover, 2-12% of behaviors show adaption to intraday news, events, and environments, characterized by dual equilibrium states and abrupt reference point shifts, while purely independent modes occur in less than 5% of cases. These findings empirically support the LCA hypothesis, as observable trading behaviors reflect underlying brain mechanisms and internal intelligence decision-making in behavioral psychology. Our results highlight the necessity of incorporating adaptive entangled game modules into artificial general intelligence (AGI) architectures, addressing the limitations of conventional artificial neural network (ANN)-based AI, which relies on trillions of opaque parameters. By integrating ANN-based AI with probability-wave-based entangled-brain simulations, machine learning can enrich AGI foundation models (FMs) and facilitate the development of human-like processing units (HPUs) that leverage brain-inspired mechanisms. Such HPUs may ultimately create more compact, efficient, and robust AGI systems, particularly for embodied intelligence and robotics.
We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a mathematical foundation for studying equilibrium in NeuroAI and can be viewed as an extension of game theory under relaxed assumptions, including partial observability, bounded computation, and uncertainty. At its core, Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium (MIE) generalizes the classical Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation. Rather than being defined solely at the level of observable behavior, equilibrium emerges when neural learning dynamics, cognitive representations, and behavioral strategies mutually stabilize between interacting agents. This framework applies uniformly to interactions between two biological brains, two artificial agents, or hybrid human-AI systems. We discuss applications of multilevel game theory to human-autonomous vehicle driving, human-machine interaction, human-large language model (LLM) interaction, and computational psychiatry. We also outline experimental strategies and computational methods for estimating MIE and discuss challenges and prospects for future research.
We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.
Conventional algorithmic trading systems are grounded in deterministic heuristics or offline-trained statistical models that cannot adapt to the semantic complexity of rapidly shifting market regimes. This paper introduces AGENTICAITA, an agentic AI framework that replaces the traditional signal then execute paradigm with a fully autonomous deliberative loop in which multiple specialized Large Language Model agents reason, negotiate, and act in concert - without any offline training or human intervention. The framework proposes four architectural contributions: (i) an Adaptive Z-Score Trigger Engine that acts as a cognitive resource allocator, gating LLM inference exclusively on statistically anomalous market conditions; (ii) a Sequential Deliberative Pipeline - the core agentic contribution - in which an Analyst agent, a Risk Manager agent, and an Executor agent form a structured reasoning chain governed by typed JSON contracts and a deterministic hard-gate safety layer; (iii) an Inference Gating Protocol, a mutex-based cognitive resource scheduler that serializes concurrent agent activations and ensures fully reproducible audit trails; and (iv) a Correlation-Break Diversification composite score that operationalizes portfolio-level idiosyncratic signal prioritization within individual agent reasoning. Validated over a five-day autonomous dry-run session under live market conditions, the framework demonstrates operational correctness of the deliberative pipeline, achieving 157 zero-intervention invocations across 76 assets with an 11.5% agentic friction rate that confirms non-trivial inter-agent negotiation. This preliminary proof-of-concept establishes the feasibility of training-free, deterministic safety-constrained multi-agent orchestration in financial decision loops, with statistically robust performance evaluation and execution cost modeling deferred to extended live deployment.