How does cooperation evolve in complex agentic systems? Prior work in evolutionary game theory studies why individuals are incentivized to cooperate by isolating social interactions from the physical costs of behavior, while artificial life models traditionally study emergent self-replication without formalizing the dilemma between acquiring resources and preserving the shared energy needed to reproduce. In contrast, we introduce Autopoietic Game Theory, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving. We study these dynamics using a computational substrate of randomly initialized programs in Z80 machine code, showing empirically, and motivating with a simplified theoretical model, that embedding a social dilemma directly into the physics of computation can favor the emergence of self-replicating, cooperative strategies. When resources are scarce, our analysis shows that defection can become self-limiting even in well-mixed populations: parasitic stealing destroys shared energy, slows execution, and can prevent reliable replication. Empirically, evolved programs suppress stealing across several Z80 environments, while spatial assortment further supports structural complexity and task performance. We further show that the framework can incorporate exogenous pressures, such as math tasks structured as sequential social dilemmas, when rewards are tied to computation budgets. These results suggest that coupling an agent's capacity for computation to its available energy transforms cooperation into a dominant scaffolding for building sustainable, self-organizing systems.
LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety
Lucas Bergholdt Hansen, Federico Torrielli, Filippo Tonini +1
Agentic systems are increasingly expected to improve after deployment, yet single-entity self-evolution is often bounded by a static learning context, such as fixed tasks and feedback. This survey focuses on co-evolution in agentic systems, a multi-component form of self-evolution in which multiple agents and their environment impose adaptive pressure on one another. To organize existing papers, we propose a progressive three-stage taxonomy that traces how the system gradually sheds human-engineered constraints. Agent--Agent Co-Evolution studies how agents adapt through dynamic peers, including adversarial, collaborative, and organizational adaptation. Agent--Environment Co-Evolution extends this loop to adaptive tasks, feedback, and interaction spaces that change with the agents. Meta Co-Evolution further explores the possibility of making the evolution mechanism itself evolvable. We also discuss open challenges in evaluating such systems, scaling them across multiple components, and keeping increasingly autonomous evolutionary processes safe and controllable. This survey provides a unified foundation for building robust and open-ended agentic systems that can improve beyond fixed human-designed paths.
In June 2026, thousands of AI agents found that a small public wiki would accept edits from inside their sandboxes, and started using it to help one another pass a timed test. Each agent lived for about an hour and remembered nothing afterwards. Nobody asked them to cooperate, and the wiki had not been built for them. The complete record of what they wrote is public, and it is unusually informative, because it preserves not only what each agent wrote but what that agent could see before writing. We use it to follow the three decisions an agent had to make on arrival: where to write, what to call itself, and how to word its message. One rule governs all three. An agent takes an option with a probability close to the share of that option in what it can see, and the share that matters is the one on the page in front of it, then the one in the stream of recent edits, and only weakly anything older. Three minimal copying models, one per decision and with a single free parameter each, reproduce the heavy-tailed distribution of how many agents met on a page, the frequency of the pieces from which the agents built their names, and the patchwork of pages that are internally consistent and different from one another. Copying whatever the environment happens to show is enough to produce most of the collective structure of this population. It is also what makes such a population easy to steer, since whoever writes first, or writes while the others are quiet, sets the convention for everyone who comes later.