Deep-Fake CAPTCHA: Mitigating Next-Generation Social Engineering Attacks
Authors: Guy Frankovits, Lior Yasur, Fred M. Grabovski, Yisroel Mirsky
Abstract
This paper presents DF-CAPTCHA, an active defense against real-time deepfake impersonation in voice and video calls. Instead of passively searching for artifacts, DF-CAPTCHA prompts the caller to perform simple challenge-response tasks that are easy for humans but difficult for current real-time deepfake systems to generate convincingly. The framework verifies the response using four criteria: realism, identity consistency, task completion, and response time. We evaluate the approach across both audio and video modalities using user studies and experiments with real-time deepfake models. Results show that people often struggle to distinguish real-time deepfakes from authentic media, while DF-CAPTCHA substantially improves detection performance over passive methods, reaching high accuracy in both modalities. These findings suggest that active challenge-based verification is a practical and robust defense against next-generation social engineering attacks based on real-time deepfakes.
Audio deepfakes have improved rapidly recently, yet their effect on human trust in real speech remains unstudied. We present the largest listening study on audio deepfake perception to date, collecting 35,532 judgments from 1,768 participants across 138 text-to-speech and voice conversion systems. Our central finding is a skepticism shift: compared to a 2021 baseline, human accuracy on fake samples barely changed (72.9% to 71.2%), but accuracy on real samples dropped from 72.7% to 64.1%. Participants are not worse at detecting synthesis artifacts; rather, they increasingly distrust authentic speech. Samples generated by commercial and autoregressive language model systems proved hardest to detect (61.3 - 65.9%), while those from traditional seq2seq and flow-matching models remain easier to spot (75.4 - 76.8%). An ML detector that served as a reference point maintained over 94.5% accuracy across all conditions. Our results suggest that the primary threat posed by modern deepfakes may not be mere deception, but the erosion of trust in genuine audio.
With the rapid advancement of speech generation technologies, the threat posed by speech deepfakes in real-time communication (RTC) scenarios has intensified. However, existing detection studies mainly focus on offline simulations and struggle to cope with the complex distortions introduced during RTC transmission, including unknown speech enhancement processes (e.g., noise suppression) and codec compression. To address this challenge, we present the first large-scale speech deepfake dataset tailored for RTC scenarios, termed \textit{RTCFake}, totaling approximately 600 hours. The dataset is constructed by transmitting speech through multiple mainstream social media and conferencing platforms (e.g., Zoom), enabling precise pairing between offline and online speech. In addition, we propose a phoneme-guided consistency learning (PCL) strategy that enforces models to learn platform-invariant semantic structural representations. In this paper, the RTCFake dataset is divided into training, development, and evaluation sets. The evaluation set further includes both unseen RTC platforms and unseen complex noise conditions, thereby providing a more realistic and challenging evaluation benchmark for speech deepfake detection. Furthermore, the proposed PCL strategy achieves significant improvements in both cross-platform generalization and noise robustness, offering an effective and generalizable modeling paradigm. The \textit{RTCFake} dataset is provided in the {https://huggingface.co/datasets/JunXueTech/RTCFake}.
Deepfakes are increasingly realistic and easy to produce, raising concerns about the reliability of human judgments in misinformation settings. We study audiovisual deepfake detection by measuring how consistently crowd workers distinguish authentic from manipulated videos and, when they flag a video as manipulated, how accurately they identify the manipulation type (audio-only, video-only, or audio-video) and how consistently they report manipulation timestamps. We run two matched crowdsourcing studies on Prolific using AV-Deepfake1M and the Trusted Media Challenge (TMC) dataset. We sample 48 videos per dataset (96 total) and collect 960 judgments (10 per video). Results show that crowd workers rarely misclassify authentic videos as manipulated, but they miss many manipulations, and agreement remains limited across videos. Aggregating multiple judgments per video stabilizes the authenticity signal, but it cannot recover manipulations that most workers consistently miss. Manipulation type identification is substantially noisier than authenticity detection even when workers detect a manipulation, with joint audio-video cases being particularly hard to recognize. Overall, these findings suggest that crowdsourcing can provide a scalable screening signal for audiovisual authenticity, while reliable modality attribution remains an open challenge.