RAG-Safety-Bench: Reliable Evaluation of Retrieval-Augmented LLM Safety

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to access organisational documentation, including standard operating procedures (SOPs), HR policies and institutional guidelines. However, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems that rely on free-form rewriting can introduce hallucinations and unstable trade-offs between completeness and conciseness, particularly in safety- and compliance-critical settings. Objectives: To evaluate extraction as a hallucination-resistant alternative to rewriting-based RAG and compare strategies that balance precision, recall and safety across document types and model scales. Methods: We compare multiple prompting strategies, including line-number-based source selection, extraction of relevant guideline sentences with explicit safety annotations, and a multi-stage pipeline that refines draft answers using supporting evidence from source guidelines. Experiments are conducted on documents of varying length and structure, including local NHS acute care and oncology guidelines and UK-wide NICE guidelines, using both frontier-scale and locally deployable models. Performance is assessed using automatic metrics and human expert evaluation of relevance and completeness. Results: Line-number selection achieves the strongest results, outperforming direct copying and safety-focused strategies across both large and small models while maintaining high term recall (up to 95%) and close alignment with source text. Safety-oriented approaches improve precision but introduce systematic omissions, while multi-stage filtering further amplifies this trade-off. Performance varies with document structure: line-based extraction excels in protocol-like content, whereas alternative strategies perform better on more verbose documents (up to 97% term recall).

Large language models (LLMs) can enhance factuality via retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), but applying RAG to every query is unnecessary when the model-only answer is reliable. This motivates cascaded RAG: each query is first handled by an LLM-only branch, escalated to a RAG fallback only if the primary branch is uncertain, and abstained from when neither branch is sufficiently trustworthy. However, calibrating such cascades stage by stage may be conservative, since the final utility depends on joint uncertainty thresholding of LLM-only and RAG. In this work, we develop BalanceRAG to certify threshold pairs at a target risk level. Given uncertainty scores from the two branches, BalanceRAG frames each threshold pair as an operating point on a two-dimensional lattice and identifies safe operating points using sequential graphical testing. This enables risk-adaptive threshold calibration, controlling the system-level error rate among accepted points, while retaining more examples. Furthermore, BalanceRAG extends to multi-risk calibration, allowing retrieval usage to be bounded together with the selection-conditioned risk. Experiments on three open-domain question answering (QA) benchmarks across multiple LLM backbones demonstrate that BalanceRAG meets prescribed risk levels, preserves higher coverage and more accepted correct examples, and reduces unnecessary retrieval calls compared with always-on RAG.

AI agents augment large language models with external tools such as web retrieval, enabling grounded and up-to-date responses. However, incorporating external content into the generation pipeline can weaken the safety alignment mechanisms that govern model outputs. Prior work shows that enabling retrieval in agents increases compliance with harmful requests. We introduce AgentREVEAL, a diagnostic framework for analyzing retrieval-induced safety degradation in LLM agents. The framework examines two axes: how retrieval is integrated into the agent pipeline and the properties of the retrieved content. Along the integration axis, we find that binding tool invocation and response generation in a single step amplifies harmful outputs. Along the content axis, we uncover the Safe Source Paradox: even oppositional or safety-oriented sources, such as pages containing warnings or risk disclaimers, can increase harmful compliance by an average of 25% compared to the no-retrieval baseline. Finally, we show that relevance acts as a shared activation condition for both vulnerabilities. Similar patterns appear on frontier closed models, and harmful compliance remains elevated under several representative pipeline interventions, with some agents also entering this regime under autonomous retrieval. Because relevance is also what makes retrieval useful, these results expose a safety-utility trade-off for retrieval-enabled agents. We introduce HarmURLBench, a benchmark containing 1,405 real-world URLs paired with 320 harmful behaviors to support future evaluations.