A latent dimension of Condorcet's jury theorem for multiple AI advisers

Multi-agent systems of LLMs add discussion to majority voting and are therefore expected to be more capable. However, empirical reports conflict on whether discussion improves accuracy or leads to an incorrect consensus. Here, we introduce a parsimonious model that explains when discussion improves accuracy and when it ends in an incorrect consensus, built from four behaviors repeatedly observed in LLM agents: (1) withholding dissent, (2) internalizing a stated answer, (3) reconsidering after seeing dissent, and (4) correcting toward the correct answer. The model shows that discussion can overturn an incorrect initial majority only when the withholding rate $c$ is below a critical rate $c^* = γ/(γ+ a)$, set by the net correction rate $γ$ and the internalization rate $a$. We estimate these rates from conversation logs with a Bayesian method and place LLM teams relative to $c^*$. As the model predicts, the gain from discussion shrinks as withholding rises, across LLMs and on a hidden profile benchmark, HiddenBench, and MedEInst. Instructing agents not to withhold dissent increases this gain. Turning reasoning off also increases the gain, because reasoning raises the internalization rate $a$ and keeps agents from reconsidering a minority answer. These findings reconcile the conflicting reports and identify when discussion outperforms majority voting.

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.

Selecting the correct answer from a pool of candidate reasoning chains is the engine of test-time scaling, yet the standard selectors each carry a cost: self-consistency inherits the errors of the single model it resamples, and trained reward models need labeled data and transfer poorly off-distribution. We study a third signal, free at inference time: cross-model consensus, the degree to which independently trained models, each solving the problem once, agree on a final answer. We treat the panel as an LLM-jury, in which the structure of agreement, not any model's score of another, is the verification signal. Across seven benchmarks it selects correct answers better than self-consistency and far better than a model scoring its own candidates: on competition math it closes the entire gap to an oracle selector, while self-scoring closes almost none. The mechanism is error decorrelation: independently trained models err differently, so their wrong answers scatter while the correct one accumulates agreement. We make this precise with a parameter-free law, derived in closed form, that predicts consensus accuracy from three measured panel statistics to a mean absolute error of $0.03$ and exposes the method's ceiling: a shared-error floor where models share a misconception, near zero on math but non-trivial on science. Against four trained verifiers spanning discriminative, outcome, and generative reward models, the free LLM-jury matches the strongest inside their math training domain and is the top selector outside it. Cross-model consensus is thus a verifier we can characterize in advance: a law that says when to trust it, and a floor that marks where it cannot.