Intelligence Under Time Constraints: Rethinking Test-Time Compute

Many algorithms spend an internal resource before returning a decision and are evaluated only by the quality of that terminal output. We formalize such procedures as terminal computation-allocation problems: costly computations produce observations, update beliefs about a latent environment, and matter only through terminal decision loss. Bellman equations characterize optimal allocation under fixed budgets, priced computation, and exact certification. We then relate value of computation (VOC) to information. Mutual information equals myopic VOC under log loss, whereas under simple regret VOC is a knowledge-gradient quantity; moreover, information gain can rank computations arbitrarily poorly, although it gives a one-sided upper bound on VOC. Bandit pulls, tree simulations, and node expansions illustrate the same model under different computation topologies. Finally, under an explicit frontier-resolution and heuristic-error model, maximizing approximate VOC recovers weighted A*, with A* and greedy best-first search as limiting cases. The theory identifies a shared decision problem without asserting that one acquisition rule is universally optimal.

Test-time compute scaling allocates inference computation uniformly, uses fixed sampling strategies, and applies verification only for reranking. In contrast, we propose a verifier-guided adaptive framework treating reasoning as iterative trajectory generation and selection. For each problem, the agent runs multiple inference iterations. In each iteration, it optionally produces a high-level plan, selects a set of reasoning tools and a compute strategy together with an exploration parameter, and then generates a candidate reasoning trajectory. A process reward model (PRM) serves as a unified control signal: within each iteration, step-level PRM scores are aggregated to guide pruning and expansion during generation, and across iterations, aggregated trajectory rewards are used to select the final response. Across datasets, our dynamic, PRM-guided approach consistently outperforms direct test-time scaling, yielding large gains on MATH-500 and several-fold improvements on harder benchmarks such as AIME24 and AMO-Bench. We characterize efficiency using theoretical FLOPs and a compute intensity metric penalizing wasted generation and tool overhead, demonstrating that verification-guided allocation concentrates computation on high-utility reasoning paths.

Additional inference compute can increase the number of correctly resolved security-assurance tasks, but repeated success, unique coverage, accepted evidence, and operational protection are different quantities. We develop a resource-constrained framework that separates them. For repeated conditionally independent attempts with latent success probability $\Theta$, coverage is $C_n = 1 - E[(1-\Theta)^n]$, and its limiting value is $1 - P(\Theta = 0)$. Positive pairwise outcome correlation does not by itself imply a ceiling below one: we construct two models with the same mean success and pairwise correlation but different limiting coverage. We distinguish this result from the effective sample size used to estimate a mean, and show why finite-budget observations cannot generally identify an asymptotic support ceiling. We then connect coverage to fallible evidence checking, proper scoring of factual grounding, complete resource accounting, service capacity, and a response model that includes mitigation delay. A conceptual defensive architecture separates evidence analysis, adjudication, and operational authority. An evaluation protocol specifies held-out tasks, paired comparisons, negative cases, and uncertainty reporting. The contribution is a consistent theoretical synthesis and a set of counterexamples to invalid extrapolations, rather than an empirical scaling law. All numerical illustrations are analytic; no model-parity result, hardware benchmark, or general attacker-defender equilibrium is claimed.