cs.AISep 16, 2026

Flag Game: A Toy Model for Mechanistic Swarm Interpretability

Authors: Elizabeth PavlovaHidenori Tanaka

Abstract

Emergent coordinated behaviors of AI agents are starting to present critical safety risks. A key phenomenon driving these behaviors is the rapid formation and spread of beliefs about the world, and mechanistic understanding is crucial for collective alignment. To this end, we introduce the Flag Game, a toy model for studying the mechanisms of collective belief formation. Concretely, a hidden country flag defines the ground truth, and each bounded agent directly observes only a private crop but can exchange beliefs and weigh social evidence from peers. Despite its simplicity, the Flag Game reproduces rich collective phenomenology: non-monotonic scaling of performance with population size, accuracy gains from social-awareness prompting and team diversity, and strong effects of organizational structure. In particular, we identify that collective belief collapse at small population sizes turns into collective belief polarization as the population grows. This polarization causes the performance decline at large population sizes, but creates diversity in collective beliefs. Finally, we dissect the mechanisms underlying collective belief collapse and polarization with two complementary approaches. We first introduce social circuit attribution, a technique to predict which agent, and what view, matters most to collective dynamics, and verify its predictions by causal interventions on agents, tracing how agent patching changes collective outcomes. However, the efficacy of causal interventions on agents decreases as the population grows. We therefore develop a statistical mechanical theory for larger populations and verify that it matches the empirical phase diagram. Together, these results take a first step toward mechanistic swarm interpretability, a science of how the properties of individual agents and their communication give rise to emergent collective behavior.

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