For Your Eyes Only: Evaluating Coordination Between Isolated Language Model Instances

Existing multi-model and tool-augmented systems communicate by generating text, serializing every exchange through the output vocabulary. Can two pretrained language models instead coordinate through a continuous, concurrent channel? The Bicameral Model couples two frozen language models through a trainable neural interface on their intermediate hidden states. At every generation step, both models run in lockstep: a primary model drives the task while an auxiliary model operates tools, solves constraints, or executes code, with both conditioning on each other's activations through a translation network and a learned suppression gate ($\sim$1% of combined parameters). The gate learns a selective communication protocol from task loss alone, without a prescribed format. We demonstrate the mechanism across three tool backends. On arithmetic, coupling two 0.5B models with a calculator raises accuracy from 36% to 96%. On logic grid puzzles, coupling two 0.6B models with a Z3 solver achieves $1.7\times$ the unaugmented baseline on ZebraLogic. On mathematical reasoning, coupling with a Python sandbox enables the auxiliary to generate problem-specific code from hidden-state signals alone, without ever seeing the problem text.

Coordination, a fundamental linguistic structure, remains a subject of intense debate, and its exact nature continues to elude theoretical linguistics. A common view holds that only same-category constituents can be conjoined, which has been challenged by the many grammatical unlike coordinations found in natural language. Treating language models as a computational testbed, we investigate whether the acquisition of unlike coordination requires direct exposure in the training data, or whether it can emerge organically from general compositional abilities. Using Filtered-Corpus Training (FiCT), we train GPT-2 models on corpora from which all instances of unlike coordination have been removed. We find that direct exposure is not necessary: models trained on filtered data successfully generalize to unlike coordination, achieving perplexity and grammaticality judgments comparable to models trained on unfiltered text. Furthermore, our analyses of internal representations indicate that language models process unlike coordination by treating the conjoined elements as belonging to similar structural categories or through a mechanism akin to deletion, both of which appear learnable from exposure to alike coordination alone. This work contributes to the growing understanding of how language models internally represent linguistic structures, while also adding to the broader debate on coordination by showing how models generalize and process unlike coordination without direct exposure.

When a person shares something with a language model, the model often answers the surface of the message rather than what the sender was doing by sending it: share a finished project and it critiques the code; share a raw late-night line and it runs a wellness check. We treat the sender's communicative intent, the Gricean what-was-meant, as a first-class interpretability object, and show the failure is one of readout on top of a robust representation. A linear probe decodes the sender's intent, whether they want a thing recognized or evaluated, from a model's default-pass hidden states, cleanly and surface-independently, across six models and four families and in the base checkpoints. The representation generalizes further, to intent that is only pragmatically inferred, and to a second, lexically clean intent (support versus help). The behavioral half of the story, and every causal test, is established on the recognize/evaluate contrast, where what varies is whether the default output acts on the intent. The readout lags the representation in depth within a model (the intent is decodable several layers before it drives the output); across models, which ones act on it by default is model-specific, an observed stratification (three of six show the failure) that we do not read as a scaling law. Where the gap is open, a direction closely tied to the representation, the discriminative direction at a searched-for layer, is a causal handle: steering it recovers the intended behavior, as well as an explicit instruction does and with no prompt at all. This direction is near-orthogonal to the feedback-offering axis, so it routes a represented intent rather than a generic feedback knob, though at the recovery dose the routed intent can override an explicit request. We support each link with controls against obvious deflations and report the nulls as plainly as the confirmations.