cs.CLSep 22, 2026

Truth for Believable AI: Expressed Doubt, Provenance, and Belief Revision as an Engineerable Stance

Authors: Sebastian Cochinescu

Abstract

Conversational agents often express answers in a uniformly confident register. We test whether expressed uncertainty, provenance-aware assertion, and explicit belief revision can be implemented as a behavior layer over a fixed language model; we do not test believability or trust. The layer combines three epistemic states, per-claim confidence and typed provenance, a provenance-gated expression rule, and a persistent revision store with auditable acknowledgments and partial resistance to false corrections. We evaluate it on a constructed, mechanically scored multi-session benchmark using a synthetic model and Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct. The synthetic instrument passes all five checks. On the real model, acknowledgment soundness, a by-construction guarantee, holds in 100% of cases, and true corrections are accepted more often than false ones (0.44 vs. 0.15 on held beliefs; 0.875 vs. 0.420 including rule-accepted corrections of unheld facts), but the pre-specified expression-fidelity, contradiction-separation, and provenance margins fail. A disclosed post hoc analysis shows that expression gated on mean answer-token probability ranks correctness below chance end to end (AUC 0.41, conversation-clustered), whereas gating on sampling consistency discriminates (AUC 0.66). A consistency-gated configuration selected from this finding and evaluated under a separately committed protocol meets the conversation-level manipulation and capability-equivalence criteria and replicates on a redrawn conversation set. The manipulation result is selection-dependent, and both criteria remain unresolved when uncertainty is clustered over the 60 facts. The supported conclusions are limited to the by-construction audit guarantee, store-dependent partial correction discrimination, and a benchmark- and model-specific failure of token-probability gating; scaling the fact base is required before human evaluation.

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