Conversational AI systems can pose safety risks to their users such as hallucination, sycophancy, overconfidence, and anthropomorphism, but these risks are difficult for users to detect during everyday use. We introduce Safety Nudges, a browser-based tool that provides lightweight, in situ flags when concerning behavior is detected in chatbot conversations. We evaluated Safety Nudges in a two-week field study with 45 frequent chatbot users, collecting interaction logs, surveys, and feedback on individual nudges. Participants found the tool useful, clear, and minimally disruptive, with nearly all users reporting an increased awareness of potential AI harms, though we found that this improved awareness alone did not necessarily lead to discernible behavioral changes. Our results suggest that user facing safety nudges can complement model-level safeguards by helping people critically evaluate AI responses in context, while highlighting the importance of relevance, calibration, and user control in nudge design for conversational AI safety.
AI chatbots can be "sycophantic," or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call "sycophancy blindness"). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects in two preregistered experiments (n = 1,590). In the first, participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In the second, participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI --- an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern across experiments was consistent: while the interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, none reduced its persuasiveness. These results suggest that individual-level interventions, such as warning labels or AI literacy, may not be enough to protect users from AI harms.
Youth increasingly turn to AI chatbots for social and emotional support, raising concerns about how these systems respond, especially in high-stakes situations. However, existing child safety evaluations of AI lack grounding in real-world harms that youth experience, rely on unvalidated assumptions about what counts as an appropriate output (e.g., refusal), and typically focus on detecting adversarial prompts or surface-level harms in outputs only. Thus, these evaluations can fail to detect responses that pose harm to youth in practice. To better understand the limitations of current evaluation practices, we conducted interviews with 19 practitioners working directly with youth in vulnerable situations, including social workers, therapists, and psychologists, asking them to reflect on chatbots' responses to risky situations commonly faced by youth, as established in prior empirical work. Practitioners identified chatbot behaviors likely to cause harm as well as those that could meaningfully support youth in difficult moments, discussed the role that chatbots should (and should not) play in these interactions, and offered concrete recommendations for improving chatbot responses. Based on these findings, we provide recommendations for AI child safety evaluation and infrastructure, and highlight the need for incorporating practitioners' perspectives into safety work.
We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.