Learning the Cost of Reliable Inference

We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize the allocation, or exit. Larger allocations can improve accuracy but increase token cost and latency. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive the user's unique optimal customized allocation in closed form. For any price, the acceptable defaults form either an empty set or a compact interval. We characterize the provider's optimal default through a three-regime rule, reduce equilibrium computation to a one-dimensional price optimization, and prove the existence of the equilibrium. We further show that defaults affect the implemented reasoning allocation only when users value the convenience of avoiding customization; otherwise, every service-providing outcome implements the user's optimal customized allocation. Experiments with two compact open-weight reasoning models on five mathematics and science benchmarks support the accuracy-token model and show how model and task characteristics determine equilibrium prices, defaults, and reasoning allocations.

Per-token billing is now the standard pricing model for commercial large language models (LLMs), so the honesty of reported token counts directly affects what users pay. We show that this kind of billing is hard to audit by design: providers hide the model, the tokenizer, and the execution to protect their IP, mitigate jailbreaks, and preserve user privacy, which means an auditor can only inspect proofs the provider supplies. The audit therefore reduces to a consistency check on the provider's own reports. We call this a trust paradox: every audit must trust some artifact, but current frameworks trust exactly the ones a provider has the strongest reason to manipulate. We study three recent token auditing frameworks and show that a provider with ordinary commercial capabilities can systematically inflate billed token counts. In the most permissive setting, hidden reasoning usage can be inflated by 1,469% on average without detection. At current frontier reasoning prices, that turns a $100 honest bill into roughly a $1,569 bill on the same query. Even when the user can see the full reasoning string, tokenization ambiguity alone still allows 50.85% over-reporting below the detection threshold. These results suggest the problem is not in any specific auditor but in any audit whose evidence comes from the audited party. Restoring honest billing will require verification that ties reported token counts to evidence the provider does not control, such as trusted execution attestation, cryptographic proofs of inference, or third-party re-execution.

Routing each query to a cost-effective large language model (LLM) is critical for balancing quality and cost, yet most routers rely on a centralized task center to predict model performance, creating an information-risk mismatch and a scalability bottleneck as the model pool grows. We propose a market-based routing paradigm that shifts ex-ante prediction to LLM providers via a reverse auction, where providers bid with self-predicted success probabilities and execution costs. To account for inherently noisy provider predictions and center evaluations, we introduce the \textit{\textbf{E}rror-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{R}everse \textbf{A}uction \textbf{M}echanism} (EA-RAM), which explicitly models this inherent Dual Error. We prove that EA-RAM is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational under the Dual Error, establish sufficient conditions for center rationality, and derive an explicit welfare-loss bound. We further identify robustness effects: opposite-signed errors can cancel, vanishing-tail link functions (e.g., logistic) stabilize clear-cut cases via saturation, and extra noise smooths belief maps, reducing the gains from marginal manipulation. Experiments on simulations and real-world benchmarks show that EA-RAM is robust to the Dual Error and achieves a better cost--performance Pareto frontier than centralized baselines, with additional gains when providers contribute local information, validating its practical effectiveness.