econ.GNSep 23, 2026

Shopping by algorithm: How agentic AI deploys human heuristics as a surrogate consumer

Authors: Davood Wadi, Yu Ma

Organizations: Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Abstract

Consumers increasingly delegate purchasing decisions to Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as surrogate consumers. Using "Tool-Lab," an adaptation of information-board process tracing that places product attributes behind costly tool calls, we examine how marketing pricing cues (i.e., just-below pricing and promotional framing) influence AI shopping agents. Across eight commercially deployed LLMs from three providers, we trace pre-choice information acquisition. Under zero cost, pricing cues rarely mislead. Imposing acquisition costs under a vague goal prompt leads LLMs to omit diagnostic attributes required to compute unit price and choose suboptimal choices resembling human heuristics. Relative to a specific goal prompt that mainly preserves diagnostic search and choice optimality, a vague goal prompt under constraints creates a search-mediated vulnerability. This research demonstrates that marketing heuristics in delegated AI shopping are governed by storefront information architecture, not necessarily immutable LLM flaws.

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