Bringing AI to Autonomous Systems -- From Cognition to Collective Intelligence

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models has given rise to autonomous LLM-based agents capable of complex reasoning and execution. As these agents transition from isolated operation to collaborative ecosystems, we witness the emergence of the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) network, a paradigm where heterogeneous agents autonomously coordinate to solve multi-step tasks. While these networks may offer better task performance compared to simply using one agent to complete the entire task, they introduce systemic vulnerabilities, such as adversarial composition, semantic misalignment, and cascading operational failures, that existing agent alignment techniques cannot address. In this vision paper, we argue that the trustworthiness of A2A networks cannot be fully guaranteed via retrofitting on existing protocols that are largely designed for individual agents. Rather, it must be architected from the very beginning of the A2A coordination framework. We present a comprehensive conceptual framework that situates trust in A2A systems through four design pillars.

The transition from passive foundation models to autonomous, goal-directed agentic AI systems has introduced unprecedented capabilities by coupling recursive cognitive reasoning loops, persistent memory architectures, live tool execution planes, and multi-agent collaboration topologies. However, granting probabilistic neural cores execution authority across filesystems, networks, and cloud infrastructure dissolves classical security perimeters: natural language simultaneously serves as input data, internal control code, and communication protocols, exposing a Turing-complete blast radius where untrusted data represents executable instructions. This survey delivers a comprehensive systems-security reference framework for trustworthy agentic AI, synthesizing 206 foundational studies and regulatory standards. We formalize the general agent architecture as a stateful 5-tuple and establish a 6-dimensional trustworthiness taxonomy covering security, safety, privacy, explainability, fairness, and accountability. We systematically analyze threat surfaces across intra-execution loops and interaction planes, formulate a multi-layered zero-trust defense-in-depth architecture integrating Dual-LLM isolation, Capability-Based Access Control, kernel eBPF probes, and sandboxed runtimes, review standardized evaluation benchmarks, and map technical controls to international AI governance frameworks.

Existing AI measurement frameworks quantify cognitive capability, task automation, or catastrophic risk, but none measure autonomous agency: the extent to which a system behaves in a self-directed way. A system can saturate capability benchmarks while remaining entirely reactive, acting only when prompted and ceasing all activity when a task completes. We introduce the Autonomous Agency Scale (AAS), a behavioral framework that scores AI systems on a 0-5 lexicon across seven dimensions of agency: cognitive autonomy, temporal persistence, environmental agency, social agency, creative agency, self-awareness, and goal formation, each operationalized by falsifiable threshold tests. Every dimension is scored in two temporal bands: an Active band covering engaged, user-initiated activity, and an Ambient band covering idle periods. Ambient Level 4 is gated by the Idle-Gap Test, a counterfactual criterion (remove all triggers and observe whether internally derived activity persists) that separates self-direction from scheduled rule-following. We apply the scale to six contemporary systems spanning task agents (Claude Code, Manus, Hermes), consumer assistants (ChatGPT, Siri), and a persistent companion architecture (Airi). The two-band profile quantifies a boundary that single-score frameworks conflate: task agents reach Active composites of 2.3-2.4 while scoring 0.6-1.9 Ambient, with every idle-period behavior attributable to user-configured schedules, whereas the companion architecture, evaluated longitudinally, is the only assessed system whose idle-period behavior survives trigger removal. We discuss limitations, including single-rater provenance, developer-evaluator bias on the longitudinal assessment, and the partially operationalized self-direction boundary in the Active band.