Modeling Student Sensemaking with LLMs and Knowledge-Graph-Guided Inference

Large language models are now widely used for everyday learning, but the underlying interactions are typically unstructured chats rather than following a curriculum. Unlike formal online learning systems, these interactions carry no prior record of the student, so any estimate of what the student already knows must be inferred from the dialogue itself. We show that this gap is not closed by scaling models alone. Frontier and education-tuned LLMs perform poorly when asked to tutor a student over an extended session, because doing so requires three things at once. The tutor must sequence a curriculum, conduct Socratic dialogue, and infer the student's knowledge state from that dialogue. We propose separating these responsibilities. Given a student query, our system constructs a prerequisite knowledge graph in which subtopics are nodes and dependencies are edges, and frames tutoring as deciding which node to teach next and how many dialogue turns to spend on it before moving on. A lightweight PPO policy handles this sequencing decision, while an LLM conducts the Socratic exchange at the chosen node and returns a signal of student progress. Across held-out STEM and non-STEM topics, our PPO-paired tutor outperforms heuristic baselines, frontier general-purpose models, and a model specialised for Socratic dialogue: on both the rate at which students reach full curriculum mastery and the number of turns required. Explicit curriculum structure delivers gains that scaling the underlying model does not.

How do LLMs decide what to teach next: by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, or by using simpler rules of thumb? We test this in a controlled task previously used to study human teaching strategies. On each trial, a teacher LLM sees a hypothetical learner's trajectory through a reward-annotated directed graph and must reveal a single edge so the learner would choose a better path if they replanned. We run a range of LLMs as simulated teachers and fit their trial-by-trial choices with the same cognitive models used for humans: a Bayes-Optimal teacher that infers which transitions the learner is missing (inverse planning), weaker Bayesian variants, heuristic baselines (e.g., reward based), and non-mentalizing utility models. In a baseline experiment matched to the stimuli presented to human subjects, most LLMs perform well, show little change in strategy over trials, and their graph-by-graph performance is similar to that of humans. Model comparison (BIC) shows that Bayes-Optimal teaching best explains most models' choices. When given a scaffolding intervention, models follow auxiliary inference- or reward-focused prompts, but these scaffolds do not reliably improve later teaching on heuristic-incongruent test graphs and can sometimes reduce performance. Overall, cognitive model fits provide insight into LLM tutoring policies and show that prompt compliance does not guarantee better teaching decisions.

What if large language models could not only infer human mindsets but also expose every blind spot in team dialogue such as discrepancies in the team members' joint understanding? We present a novel, two-step framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) both as human-style annotators of team dialogues to track the team's shared mental models (SMMs) and as automated discrepancy detectors among individuals' mental states. In the first step, an LLM generates annotations by identifying SMM elements within task-oriented dialogues from the Cooperative Remote Search Task (CReST) corpus. Then, a secondary LLM compares these LLM-derived annotations and human annotations against gold-standard labels to detect and characterize divergences. We define an SMM coherence evaluation framework for this use case and apply it to six CReST dialogues, ultimately producing: (1) a dataset of human and LLM annotations; (2) a reproducible evaluation framework for SMM coherence; and (3) an empirical assessment of LLM-based discrepancy detection. Our results reveal that, although LLMs exhibit apparent coherence on straightforward natural-language annotation tasks, they systematically err in scenarios requiring spatial reasoning or disambiguation of prosodic cues.