We study false-alert control when screening for text generated by artificial intelligence (AI). The screening procedure selects document prefixes and detectors from observed evidence and may stop before exhausting its inspection budget. We give two finite-sample constructions under document-level exchangeability between human calibration documents and a new null document, with no restriction on dependence among tokens within a document. Construction A registers a finite family of prefix-detector scores and allocates a false-alert budget across their conformal ranks. A union bound protects any executed subset of that family. Construction B calibrates the complete-path maximum of a development-fixed adaptive policy. Each partial-path maximum is bounded by the complete maximum, so a terminal conformal rank protects early stopping without splitting the error budget. We prove marginal control of any false alert across the permitted inspection path and derive necessary calibration counts for rejection. We also state oracle testing, distribution-shift, and independent-audit bounds with their additional assumptions. Both constructions protect stopping within their specified scope; neither proof constructs an e-process or justifies multiplying conformal ranks. Detection power and computational savings remain questions for empirical evaluation.
Although it is generally agreed that AI-generated text poses a broad societal risk, there is no common understanding in the AI-generated text detection literature on what constitutes harmful use. Rather, existing datasets and approaches often define their own criteria and make their own assumptions, sometimes implicitly, and often only loosely related to real-world needs and applications. To address this gap, we here systematically define various notions of AI-generated text and their characteristics. To study these, we collect AITDNA - a new benchmark of human-machine co-constructed texts that is annotated with detailed genesis information, such as the entire edit and AI-interaction history. We benchmark various machine-generated text detectors and find that they often only perform well for specific notions but not as broad detectors. We release code and data publicly.
Nils Dycke, Marina Sakharova, Nico Daheim +1
Ubiquitous Knowledge Processing Lab (UKP Lab), Department of Computer Science, Technical University of Darmstadt · National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE, Germany · Zuse School ELIZA
Student experiences and empirical studies report that "black box" AI text detectors produce high false positive rates with disproportionate errors against certain student populations, yet typically theoretical analyses model detection as a test between two known distributions for human and AI prose. This framing omits the structural feature of university assessment whereby an assessor generally does not know the individual student's writing distribution, making the null hypothesis composite. Standard application of the variational characterisation of total variation distance to this composite null shows trade-off bounds that any text-only, one-shot detector with useful power must produce false accusations at a rate governed by the distributional overlap between student writing and AI output. This is a constraint arising from population diversity that is logically independent of AI model quality and cannot be overcome by better detector engineering or technology. A subgroup mixture bound connects these quantities to observable demographic groups, providing a theoretical basis for the disparate impact patterns documented empirically. We propose suggestions to improve policy and practice, and argue that detection scores should not serve as sole evidence in misconduct proceedings.
Nathan Garland
Queensland Quantum and Advanced Technologies Research Institute, Griffith University, QLD, Australia · School of Environment and Science, Griffith University, QLD, Australia
Recent AI-generated text detection work often introduces a new benchmark together with a specialized detector tailored to it. We revisit this practice from a baseline-first perspective. Across several benchmarks, we show that a plain, fully fine-tuned RoBERTa matches or exceeds the specialized detectors those benchmarks are built around. This suggests that much of the recent architectural complexity is not what drives strong in-distribution detection. The remaining challenge is the distribution shift. The same strong baseline degrades sharply when the topic domain or generating model changes at test time, and simply adding more source data does not close the gap. We identify a key failure mode: under distribution shift, the detector can assign high-confidence machine labels to human-written text from unseen domains. We then study two lightweight domain adaptation methods to address this problem: K-shot adaptation with first-order MAML over LoRA adapters, and a per-sample confidence-weighted ensemble built on top of the adapted detector. Overall, our results suggest that progress in AI-generated text detection should be measured not only by in-distribution performance, but also by robustness under distribution shift.
Zhuoer Shen, Mingyi Wang, Shaofeng Zou +1
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Santa Barbara · School of ECEE, Arizona State University