cs.CRSep 27, 2026

The Price of Peeking: Anytime-Valid Leakage Detection on ML-KEM EM Traces

Authors: Georgios Feretzakis, Alexandros Papaspyridis

Abstract

Side-channel evaluators routinely inspect leakage tests while acquisition is still running, and extend or stop the campaign based on what they see. Fixed-horizon screening such as the Welch tt-test with threshold ∣t∣>4.5|t|>4.5 gives no error guarantee for this monitored decision rule. We study anytime-valid leakage detection based on testing by betting: SKIT-type swap-pair e-processes whose false-alarm probability is controlled uniformly over time under an explicit conditional symmetry null. In matched comparisons that share the frozen witness, rows and payoff, first-crossing detection needed 1.68-2.00×\times the traces of a fixed-horizon randomization test at 80% detection on synthetic streams, and 1.68-2.38×\times on degraded recordings from an open ML-KEM electromagnetic dataset with the primary Ridge witness at α=0.05α=0.05. With the same primary witness and level, on undegraded reference and pqm4 recordings the monitored procedure stopped early: its median stopping point was 62-72 and 146-316 evaluation traces, i.e. 2-8% of a conservative 4096-trace budget. Under exact designed nulls on the recorded backgrounds, repeated-look ∣t∣>4.5|t|>4.5 screening over all 13000-20000 samples raised a false alarm in 2.7-12.9% of replicates, against 0.0-4.7% for terminal-only screening and no rejection by a sample-wise e-Bonferroni process, which in a prespecified follow-up detected natural-label associations in 4 of 4 backgrounds after 840-3288 traces. All recordings come from one device, and natural-label results are descriptive; we state the assumptions each claim requires.

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