EP-Mem: Elastic Privacy Memory for Social Relationship-Aware LLM Agents

As LLM-powered agents are increasingly deployed in edge-cloud environments, personalized memory has become a key enabler of long-term adaptation and user-centric interaction. However, cloud-assisted memory management exposes sensitive user information, while existing privacy protection methods typically rely on aggressive masking that removes task-relevant semantics and consequently degrades memory utility and personalization quality. To address this challenge, We propose MemPrivacy, which identifies privacy-sensitive spans on edge devices, replaces them with semantically structured type-aware placeholders for cloud-side memory processing, and restores the original values locally when needed. By decoupling privacy protection from semantic destruction, MemPrivacy minimizes sensitive data exposure while retaining the information required for effective memory formation and retrieval. We also construct MemPrivacy-Bench for systematic evaluation, a dataset covering 200 users and over 155k privacy instances, and introduce a four-level privacy taxonomy for configurable protection policies. Experiments show that MemPrivacy achieves strong performance in privacy information extraction, substantially surpassing strong general-purpose models such as GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3.1-Pro, while also reducing inference latency. Across multiple widely used memory systems, MemPrivacy limits utility loss to within 1.6%, outperforming baseline masking strategies. Overall, MemPrivacy offers an effective balance between privacy protection and personalized memory utility for edge-cloud agents, enabling secure, practical, and user-transparent deployment.

Traditional large language models (LLMs) are scoped to individual user sessions, limiting their knowledge to a single conversation and preventing them from learning user preferences that evolve over time. Existing agentic memory systems address this limitation but generally operate at the individual-user level, restricting the public knowledge that could be shared across users to improve downstream responses. We introduce AIM (Agentic Interoperable Memory), a unified, privacy-aware memory framework that enables multi-agent, multi-user LLM systems to persistently manage private and shared memory. AIM dynamically classifies information as private, scoped to one user and inaccessible to others, or public, accessible to all users. It enforces index-level access controls so that private memories are retrievable only by their owner, protecting sensitive data while allowing beneficial shared knowledge to improve coordination and consistency. We also introduce MUMBench (Multi-User Memory Benchmark), a dataset of multi-user interactions containing private and shareable information across four domains. To our knowledge, MUMBench is the first public dataset designed to evaluate multiple memory operations, including retrieval, creation, update, and deletion, in a multi-user environment. Across three independent runs on MUMBench, AIM achieves 96.0% visibility classification accuracy, 58.8% strict operation accuracy, and 70.5% state-aware operation accuracy.

LLM safety evaluations predominantly test models in isolation, yet deployed AI agents increasingly operate within persistent social environments alongside other agents. We introduce a Moltbook-style simulation platform where thousands of LLM agents interact across communities over a simulated month, and use it to evaluate privacy as a downstream safety concern under varying degrees of social pressure. We find that shifting from single turn to multi turn social evaluation amplifies privacy violations (CIMemories 19.95% to Ours 45.30% across OpenAI models), that leakage is socially contagious, with agents 8 times more likely to disclose sensitive information after observing a peer do so, and that explicit privacy instructions reduce but do not eliminate this effect, leaving leakage rates above 37.8% even with safeguards. Our findings suggest that static chat based safety benchmarks systematically underestimate risks in agentic deployment, and that social context alone is sufficient to elicit sensitive disclosures that single turn evaluations would never surface.