Seeing Is Not Addressing: Auditing Linguistic Access to Frozen Visual Geometry

Contrastive vision-language models learn shared embedding spaces by aligning matched image-text pairs, yet their representations remain separated by a modality gap. Prior work reports divergent effects of modifying this gap: reducing it can improve zero-shot classification and cross-modal alignment, whereas removing gap-related structure can degrade image-text retrieval. In this paper, we provide a unified geometric explanation for these task-dependent effects. Across CLIP and SigLIP encoders, we find that a single dominant direction captures 94.4-99.9% of the squared norm of the image-text mean separation, revealing that the mean-separation component is approximately rank-one. A decomposition of the similarity score then identifies three task-specific roles. In zero-shot classification, query-side fixed gap-offset subtraction is exactly equivalent to an additive class bias. In standard cross-modal retrieval, projecting out the gap direction and renormalising residuals discards candidate-specific norm information, inducing a multiplicative ranking distortion; a geometry-derived exponent tracks the grid-search optimum (Spearman rho = 0.93) and restores performance in some settings, although the gains transfer unevenly. In mixed-modal retrieval, the gap direction sorts candidates by modality; its removal can improve cross-modal ranking, unlike random or non-gap controls. Residual semantic structure after removal defines the limits of the rank-one account. Together, these results explain why gap modification can improve, degrade, or restore performance across downstream settings. By clarifying when and why gap modification changes model behavior, this account provides a principled basis for selecting gap interventions in similarity-based vision-language systems across evaluated downstream tasks.

Visual inputs are often assumed to improve language understanding in multimodal models. We examine this assumption by asking whether vision-language models (VLMs) can distinguish useful visual evidence from incidental image context in lexical judgments. We use human concreteness and imagery ratings because they span words with varying expected visual relevance, from abstract and low-imagery words to concrete and high-imagery words. We find that real-image contexts do not yield consistent gains and often hurt alignment with human ratings, most sharply when visual evidence is least relevant. Through probing and canonical correlation analysis, complemented by an attribution case study, we find that real-image contexts are associated with representational shifts and greater sensitivity to spurious visual cues, coinciding with weaker recoverability of the targeted lexical properties. We further show that instructing models to focus solely on textual content at inference time can reduce this degradation, with the clearest gains on these vulnerable subsets. Our findings suggest that current instruction-tuned VLMs need better calibration of when visual context should inform lexical judgments.

Vision-language models (VLMs) can answer image-based questions confidently, and often correctly, even when no image is provided. This mirage behavior inflates benchmark scores without reflecting visual grounding. Prior work treats this as a single failure mode. We argue it is two. Using Mirage Probes, a contrastive probing framework that pairs paraphrased question variants with matched mirage and non-mirage labels on the same image, we show that mirage behavior is linearly decodable from internal activations across residual stream, MLP, post-attention, and attention-head sites in two open-source VLMs. We demonstrate that a Naive Bayes text baseline cannot recover this signal, ruling out surface lexical confounds. Cross-benchmark separability patterns, together with a novel Prior Harnessing Index (PHI) measuring how much a model can answer from text alone, expose two distinct regimes: textual biases, where the model answers from language priors without engaging visual representations, and spurious images, where it constructs false visual content in latent space and answers as if grounded. The distinction has direct mitigation consequences: text-distribution cleaning can address the first regime but cannot reach the second, since spurious-image mirages live in the model's visual representations rather than its text. Faithful visual grounding will require interventions at the representational level.