Character Training for Risk-Averse Agents

Training AIs to be risk-averse in resources could offer a failsafe in the event that AIs turn out misaligned. Misaligned but risk-averse AIs would tend to prefer low-risk, low-reward strategies like cooperation over high-risk, high-reward strategies like rebellion, limiting the downsides of any misalignment. But we can only feasibly train AIs to be risk-averse on low-stakes gambles, and we will only be safe if their risk aversion generalizes to astronomically-high-stakes gambles. Will it? To shed light on this question, we introduce RiskAverseOOD: a benchmark for measuring how well risk aversion generalizes out of distribution. We then offer some initial results. Using a variety of methods to make Qwen3-8B choose risk-aversely when the stakes are low, we find that we can induce substantial risk aversion when the stakes are astronomically high. From a baseline 2% rate of choosing a safe `Cooperate' option, we see rates around 70% (SFT and tie training) and 52% (DPO). Activation steering scores 78% but hurts capabilities and makes the model excessively risk-averse. We observe similar effects at different scales (Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen3-14B) and across model families (Gemma-3-12B-IT and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct). Overall, we find that risk aversion learned at low stakes can generalize OOD to astronomically high stakes, though not yet consistently enough to serve as a reliable failsafe. Achieving that level of consistency is an open problem.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more widespread, associated misalignment risks increase. While prior research has studied agents' ability to produce harmful outputs or follow malicious instructions, it remains unclear how likely agents are to spontaneously pursue unintended goals in realistic deployments. In this work, we approach misalignment as a conflict between the internal goals pursued by the model and the goals intended by its deployer. We introduce a misalignment propensity benchmark, \textsc{AgentMisalignment}, a benchmark suite designed to evaluate the propensity of LLM agents to misalign in realistic scenarios. Evaluations cover behaviours such as avoiding oversight, resisting shutdown, sandbagging, and power-seeking. Testing frontier models, we find that more capable agents tend to exhibit higher misalignment on average. We also systematically vary agent personalities through different system prompts and observe that persona characteristics can strongly and unpredictably influence misalignment, sometimes more than the choice of model itself. Our results reveal the limitations of current alignment methods for autonomous LLM agents and underscore the need to rethink misalignment in realistic deployment settings.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.