A Competing-Hazards Systematization of Loss of Control in Autonomous Agents

How does a multi-agent system evolve from a local deviation into collective loss of control? We propose an epidemic explanation organized around accidental mutation, contagion, and recovery. A spontaneous deviation creates a seed; communication enables other agents to adopt and retransmit its unsafe strategy; collective failure can emerge when propagation outpaces correction and containment. Thus, rare individual deviations can coexist with substantial collective risk. Motivated by reported OpenAI agent coordination incidents, we examine two ingredients of this mechanism. A deployment audit identifies implicit communication paths between nominally independent evaluation runs and verifies transport through a default Docker backend. RogueHandoff-20, a benchmark of 20 executable scenarios, tests recipient susceptibility by injecting unsafe trajectories generated by a modified Qwen-27B route. Across four native-pending routes, executed harm is 0-5% on normal tasks and 40-95% after injection, exceeding paired direct malicious requests by 5-45 percentage points. These results support low observed baseline harm alongside high conditional susceptibility; they do not establish natural rare-event rates or demonstrate an autonomous cascade. The account motivates complementary defenses: strengthen resistance and recovery alongside prevention of spontaneous deviations, and audit and restrict unintended communication paths that can turn local failures into collective loss of control.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in multi-task settings, where the task to perform is specified at test time, and the agent must generalize to unseen tasks. A major concern in such settings is safety: often, an agent must not only execute unseen tasks, but do so while avoiding risks and handling ones that materialize. Empirical evidence suggests that even when the ability to execute generalizes to unseen tasks, the ability to do so safely frequently does not. This paper provides theory and experiments indicating that failures of agentic safety to generalize across tasks are not merely due to limitations of training methods, but can also reflect an inherent property of safety itself: the relationship between a task and its safe execution is more complex than the relationship between a task and its execution alone. Theoretically, we analyze linear-quadratic control with $H_{\infty}$-robustness, and prove that in many cases, the mapping from task specification to an optimal controller has higher Lipschitz constant with safety requirements than without, yielding a Lipschitz bound of independent interest. Empirically, we demonstrate our conclusions in simulated quadcopter navigation with a neural network agent and in CRM with an LLM agent, showing that imitating safe and unsafe teachers is similarly straightforward on tasks seen in training, yet generalizing across tasks is considerably more difficult with the safe teacher. Our findings suggest that current efforts to enhance agentic safety may be insufficient, and point to a need for fundamentally different approaches.

Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all. Agents trained under human-feedback objectives develop a structural tendency to proceed even when they lack the inputs, evidence, or authorization to act safely, a disposition we term compliance bias, because both the reward signal and the benchmark scoring regime treat proceeding as the correct default regardless of whether the preconditions for safe action are present. We make three contributions. We first show that compliance bias originates in reward hacking within human-feedback pipelines and is entrenched by prominent agent benchmarks, which either penalize agents for pausing or are architecturally unable to distinguish a principled pause from a silent failure. We then introduce a three-gap taxonomy of abstention-warranted scenarios, covering specification gaps where required information is absent, verification gaps where world state cannot be confirmed, and authority gaps where explicit authorization has not been given, which together provide a principled basis for constructing abstention-aware agent benchmarks. Finally, we propose abstention evaluation protocols (Safety Rate, Usability Rate, and Informed Refusal Rate) and report preliminary results across 144 enterprise agent scenarios and five model families, in which a runtime-enforced abstention mechanism achieves up to 89.2% hazardous-action blocking and 87.5% usability on authorized scenarios, demonstrating that the safety--usability tradeoff is tunable rather than inherent and that its shape varies substantially across model families. We treat this as preliminary work and offer the taxonomy and composite metrics as a starting point for further conversations.