Cogentic: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Automated Proof Discovery
Organizations: Google Research · Yale University · Google DeepMind
Abstract
We present Cogentic, a multi-agent harness for automated proof discovery on open research problems. While frontier language models can generate strong mathematical ideas in a single shot, single-shot generation is often insufficient for open problems that require exploring multiple competing conjectures, overcoming subtle technical obstructions, and retaining intermediate progress over a long horizon. Cogentic addresses these challenges through an iterative prove--verify loop in which an orchestrator allocates a population of independent provers across distinct proof directions, subjects their output to adversarial verification by several specialized components, and promotes confirmed intermediate results into a persistent verified ledger that later rounds build on. The harness is designed to be able to solve research-level math and theoretical computer science problems. Using Gemini as the base model, Cogentic produced novel results on five open problems across online learning, auction theory, and mechanism design. Each result was independently verified by domain experts and is developed in full in companion papers. We list these results, and new ones as they are verified, at https://sites.google.com/view/cogentic .
Figures & tables
| Problem | Area | Prior State of the Art | Cogentic Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Online inverse linear optimization / low-regret cutting planes | Online learning & optimization | efficiently; only by an improper rule costing per round | First efficient and first proper bound, uniform in , at per round ( Cai et al., 2026a ) |
| Two-sided Bulow–Klemperer competition complexity | Auction theory & market design | agents suffice, but recruiting on both sides and with a constant of at least per side | agents on the smaller side alone suffice ( ), and does not suffice for any DSIC, IR, weakly budget-balanced mechanism ( Cai et al., 2026e ) |
| Anytime regret with experts | Online learning | Anytime vs. fixed-horizon ; the factor open | Anytime regret : no leading-order price for anytime validity ( Cai et al., 2026b ) |
| Simple vs. optimal revenue maximization, single additive buyer | Mechanism design | ( Ma and Simchi-Levi, 2021 ) | ( Cai et al., 2026d ) |
| Price of anarchy for autobidding auctions | Auction theory & autobidding | PoA for bidders; general -bidder tight mechanism open | Optimal PoA for bidders (anonymous, monotone mechanisms); for bidders ( Cai et al., 2026c ) |