$Q$ Can Play That Game: Online Fitted $Q$-Iteration for Continuous-Action Zero-Sum Markov Games with Convex-Concave Function Approximation

Reinforcement learning has been successful both empirically and theoretically in single-agent settings, but extending these results to multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum Markov games remains challenging. This paper studies the convergence of Stackelberg Q-value iteration in two-player general-sum Markov games from a control-theoretic perspective. We introduce a relaxed policy condition tailored to the Stackelberg setting and model the learning dynamics as a switching system. By constructing upper and lower comparison systems, we establish finite-time error bounds for the Q-functions and characterize their convergence properties. Our results provide a novel control-theoretic perspective on Stackelberg learning. Moreover, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper offers the first finite-time convergence guarantees for Q-value iteration in general-sum Markov games under Stackelberg interactions.

Online robust zero-sum Markov games pose a coupled operator-learning and game-solving problem: from nominal interaction data, the learner must recover a worst-case minimax Bellman operator while maintaining strategic coverage and controlling stage-game approximation error. Existing robust reinforcement-learning theory does not yet provide such an operator-learning perspective beyond specialized multi-agent settings. We develop an optimistic dual robust Bellman framework that combines dual robust Bellman fitting, optimistic minimax planning, backward-validated confidence sets, and exploiter-mix data collection. Our analysis is organized around the robust Bellman residuals induced by the candidate value class and yields a regret reduction that separates exploration complexity, robust operator-estimation error, stage-game solution error, and misspecification. Under explicit interpretable assumptions, we obtain conditional theorem interfaces for general and projected function approximation, together with closed results in several structured regimes, including tabular, epochwise cross-fit linear, self-normalized pure-online linear / finite-rank kernel, and projected RKHS truncation. Small-scale numerical experiments illustrate robustness calibration, strategic coverage, and the return-gap trade-off predicted by the framework.

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to stabilize learning and guarantee convergence. We first introduce Regularized Offline Sequential Equilibrium (ROSE), a theoretical framework that achieves a fast $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ convergence rate under unilateral concentrability, improving over the standard $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{n})$ rates in unregularized settings. We then propose Sequential Offline Self-play Mirror Descent (SOS-MD), a practical model-free algorithm based on least-squares value estimation and iterative self-play updates. We prove that the last iterate of SOS-MD attains the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ statistical rate up to a vanishing optimization error of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{T})$ in the number of self-play iterations $T$.