Belief-Trajectory Energy: Measuring the Path to a Prediction

Large language models (LLMs) generate not only reasoning text, but also token-level confidence trajectories that record how uncertainty evolves during inference. Whether these trajectories are relevant to reasoning correctness remains unclear. Here we show that confidence trajectories encode a content-agnostic confidence geometry associated with trace-level final-answer correctness. Using only token-level confidence values, without access to the input question, reasoning text, hidden states, or external verifiers, we find that low-dimensional representations of confidence trajectories separate correct from incorrect reasoning traces. Across GSM8K, MATH, and MMLU, this geometric separation is quantitatively linked to downstream predictability: stronger clustering of correct and incorrect traces, measured by the Davies--Bouldin index, consistently corresponds to higher correctness-discrimination AUC. We further show that correctness-related information is enriched in the tail of reasoning, suggesting that late-stage confidence dynamics carry key correctness signals. We propose NeuralConf, a lightweight estimator that learns from confidence trajectories for correctness evaluation. Under a fixed trace budget, NeuralConf-derived scores improve confidence-weighted answer aggregation over majority voting, tail confidence, and other static baselines. These results reveal that LLMs expose trace-intrinsic statistical signals of correctness through their own confidence dynamics, offering a route to improve inference using information already present within generation.

There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In addition to the inherent scientific interest of this question, these latent quantities are often invoked to explain the behavior of LLMs to users or to define and evaluate harmful behaviors which are relative to intent. Nevertheless, we currently lack a means to systematically test whether concepts like "belief" are well-applied to LLMs, and hence whether they are likely to be fruitful ingredients of attempts to align models with human interests. We propose an approach for empirically studying such questions, asking whether a single latent variable inferred from the LLMs' outputs -- interpreted as a degree of belief -- allows an observer to make interpretable predictions of how the LLMs' will respond to new prompts. We find that highly capable models are usefully described as holding beliefs and that, generally, the predictability of model outputs based on an inferred latent belief tracks overall trends in model capability. Building on these findings, we provide empirical strategies to study how beliefs in LLMs can be measured, the extent to which LLMs comply with instructed decision rules or payoffs, and how beliefs evolve within individual instances of an LLM over the course of reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically deployed in multi-turn conversations, where each turn provides new evidence that should reduce epistemic uncertainty about their environment. Acting rationally then requires inferring the unobserved quantities that govern it and updating beliefs about them as evidence accumulates. Yet most evaluations only score the model's final-turn answer in a single-turn format, leaving this process unexamined. We ask how closely LLMs' belief updates match those of a rational Bayesian reasoner in multi-turn settings, and introduce BayesBench, a suite of simulation environments that probe this across three progressively complex tasks: (i) Bayesian estimation, where the model infers an unknown parameter from sequential evidence; (ii) Bayesian prediction, where the model turns inferred beliefs about a latent variable into outcome forecasts; and (iii) latent-framed Bayesian prediction, where observations are filtered through a user-persona framing, requiring joint inference over the latent state and the persona. Across seven LLMs (3B--70B), scaling improves latent inference and evidence accumulation, with updates occasionally matching the Bayesian posterior. However, these gains do not reliably carry over to downstream prediction, exposing a gap between inferring latent structure and using it to rationally update beliefs about the target outcome.