cs.AIOct 4, 2026

A Safe Action Is Not Enough: Feasible-Future Decoding for Vision-Language-Action Policies

Authors: Tu Nguyen, Matthieu Zimmer, Vu Anh Vu, Ziyi Wang, Jannik Hammel Nielsen, Xuebing Zhou, Haitham Bou Ammar

Organizations: Huawei Heisenberg Research Center · Huawei Noah’s Ark Lab · TU Berlin · UCL Center for AI

Abstract

A safe action is not necessarily a viable one. A frozen vision-language-action (VLA) policy can favor a locally admissible move that leaves no policy-supported route to safe task completion. We call this the feasibility-likelihood gap: likelihood ranks the next move, while feasibility depends on the futures it leaves open. To bring those futures into the decision, we derive the exact next-block marginal of the history-conditioned policy-environment trajectory law restricted to safe task completion. The derivation reveals a candidate-dependent feasible-future mass: its support records whether safe completion remains possible under the frozen continuation process, while its magnitude measures how much weighted safe-completion mass remains. Since exact evaluation is impractical online, we develop a selective finite-candidate approximation and establish conditions for recovering the best retained viable candidate. Our alarm-triggered, training-free reranker VICS-G lowers mean cumulative safety cost by 1.9%-57.5% across six Safety-CHORES settings while remaining within 2.5 percentage points of policy sampling in success and 0.82 steps in mean episode length. Our approach offers a promising and practical path toward safer task completion, grounded in an exact policy-relative target yet requiring neither policy retraining nor online rollouts.

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