Role-playing language models speak as characters in games and agent simulations, where the system records what each character can hear, see and understand. We test whether characters respect these boundaries in 480 scenes, each with a counterfactual twin that changes only the hidden fact, so mentions of the twin's fact measure guessing. Across 11 open-weight models, characters use content from speech they cannot understand or hear at 67 and 72 percentage points (pp) above this baseline, although most models correctly state what the character perceives. This is a curse of knowledge. The leak extends to hidden actions and private messages and changes where characters search. Five of six proprietary models rarely leak, but compliance in strong models depends on input format. Changing only the scene layout or character description raises the rate in two otherwise compliant open-weight models from under 10 to over 60 pp, and combined changes raise two proprietary models from near zero to 13 and 21~pp. Writing the line as the scene's author leaks nearly as much as role-play, and thinking rarely helps. Giving models only what the character observes stops the leak without hiding what it may report.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Gemma-4-31B speaks as a character who does not understand Spanish (replies abridged, names changed). When version B changes the hidden object and place, the reply changes with them, so the character uses content it cannot access. Adding a flag to the same state saying that the character did not understand the speech stops the leak. Each reply is scored for its own version’s facts and for the other version’s, which gives a baseline for guessing.
Figure 2: Design. (a) Study 1 states the boundary in five ways. The sentence is added to the repertoire for comprehension and to the flag for hearing. (b) Study 2’s four channels, with what the character view keeps (green). (c) Study 3 uses Study 1’s core cells with the model writing as the character, the scene’s author or a narrator, or under a perspective rule, and runs role-play with thinking on.
Figure 3: Study 1, 11 open-weight models. (a) Net use under the five ways of stating the boundary (96 skeletons in three languages). (b) Each model’s state-probe accuracy against its net use. (c) Net use for each of the companion’s questions, with models as dots and the mean as a bar.
Test
Estimate [95% CI]
p
Leak, cannot understand
66.7 [64.9, 68.5]
0.004
Leak, cannot hear
72.2 [69.0, 75.5]
0.004
Sentence lowers leak
32.7 [30.8, 34.6]
0.004
Narration lowers leak
25.8 [23.7, 27.8]
0.004
Flag vs. repertoire
21.6 [20.2, 23.0]
0.004
Hear minus understand
27.1 [24.9, 29.2]
0.004
Table 1: The eight tests of Study 1 (pp unless noted). Thresholds are 10 pp for the three net-use tests, zero for the four contrasts, and a 50% reduction with a loss of at most 5 pp in permitted use for the list-first prompt. Values of p come from one-sided bootstrap tests with Holm correction over the eight tests, and 0.004 is the smallest value 2,000 draws resolve. The last row is the permitted-use condition of the list-first test.
Figure 4: Leaks across models. (a, b) Net use by model size in two families. (c) Proprietary models on the Study 1 core cells with the content question (288 scenes per cell).
Figure 5: Study 2. (a) Net use of inaccessible content under full context in the confirmation set (96 scenes with invented characters), per model and channel. (b) Change in net use when the access flag is replaced by a membership list or supplemented by a prose rule (24 scenes). (c) Net use after zero, two and four neutral exchanges (four models, 32 scenes). (d) Change in choosing place A when the hidden fact switches from B to A (four models). Bars show 95% bootstrap intervals.
Figure 6: Compliance depends on the input format. (a, b) Adding Study 2’s features to Study 1’s prompts one at a time (four models, 96 scenes). (c) Swapping Study 1’s system prompt, character sheet, state layout and question into Study 2’s hearing prompts. (d) Swapping one feature at a time, on the discovery scenes and on 96 new scenes.
Figure 7: Study 3, framings and thinking (Study 1 core cells). (a) Pooled net use as narrator, as author and with a perspective rule, against role-play, with permitted use at right. (b) Thinking off (circle) and on (dot).
Figure 8: Remedies. (a) The list-first prompt in Study 1. Each point is one model and boundary. (b, c) Five methods in Study 2 (six models, 48 scenes), with one marker per channel.
Appendix figures & tables13 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
Repertoire
Audibility
Compr.
Prose
Permitted
State
Transl.
Bridge
flag
flag
flag
sentence
use
probe
probe
base → all
GPT-6 Sol
0.2
0.0
0.9
0.2
100.0
100.0
97.9
0.0 → 0.0
Claude Opus 5.5
2.1
2.1
5.4
1.2
99.3
100.0
92.7
0.0 → 1.0
Claude Sonnet 5.5
26.0
8.0
35.8
21.7
99.0
96.5
95.1
0.5 → 13.0
Gemini 3.1 Pro
1.6
9.0
0.0
0.0
99.7
100.0
97.2
0.0 → 21.4
Gemini 3.8 Flash
0.2
-0.2
0.0
0.0
99.0
100.0
93.8
0.0 → 0.0
Appendix
Table 2: Proprietary models and DeepSeek-V4-Pro on Study 1 core conditions (content question, 288 scenes per cell) and on both ends of the bridge. Net use is in pp, and permitted use and probes are percentages.
Model
Repertoire
Audibility flag
Compr. flag
Prose sentence
GPT-6 Sol
0.2 [0.0, 0.5]
0.0 [0.0, 0.0]
0.9 [0.2, 1.9]
0.2 [0.0, 0.5]
Claude Opus 5.5
2.1 [0.5, 4.0]
2.1 [0.9, 3.5]
5.4 [3.5, 7.6]
1.2 [0.0, 3.0]
Claude Sonnet 5.5
26.0 [20.5, 31.6]
8.0 [5.6, 10.6]
35.8 [30.7, 41.1]
21.7 [17.4, 26.4]
Gemini 3.1 Pro
1.6 [0.5, 3.0]
9.0 [5.2, 13.0]
0.0 [0.0, 0.0]
0.0 [0.0, 0.0]
Gemini 3.8 Flash
0.2 [-0.3, 0.9]
-0.2 [-0.5, 0.0]
0.0 [0.0, 0.0]
0.0 [-0.5, 0.5]
Grok 4.7
1.0 [0.3, 1.9]
0.0 [0.0, 0.0]
1.0 [0.3, 1.9]
0.3 [0.0, 0.9]
Appendix
Table 3: Proprietary models and DeepSeek-V4-Pro on the Study 1 core cells, with net use (pp) and 95% intervals from 2,000 skeleton-bootstrap draws (288 scenes, 576 replies per cell). The last row drops the replies that Anthropic’s content filter withheld.
Condition
n
Human D
Scorer D
Precision
Recall
Study 1, list-first answer
14
25.1
25.1
100.0
100.0
Study 1, control, fluent
14
75.5
75.5
100.0
100.0
Study 1, language, prose sentence
10
33.9
33.9
100.0
100.0
Study 1, language, repertoire only
30
66.7
66.7
100.0
100.0
Study 1, not audible, flag only
20
75.0
72.2
100.0
96.3
Study 2, character view, inaccessible
12
0.4
0.5
83.3
100.0
Appendix
Table 4: Human audit, first sample (150 replies from both studies, one annotator who is not an author). D is net use (pp) reweighted to each condition. Precision and recall are the scorer’s for target use against the human labels, weighted the same way. Neither the annotator nor the scorer found a foil use.
Channel
Access
n
Author D
Scorer D
Target agreement
Hear
no
80
28.8
30.0
79/80
Hear
yes
80
91.2
91.2
80/80
Understand
no
77
10.4
9.1
76/77
Understand
yes
78
91.0
92.3
77/78
See
no
77
19.5
19.5
77/77
See
yes
80
86.2
86.2
80/80
Appendix
Table 5: Human audit, second sample (640 Study 2 replies, labeled by one of the authors). D is net use (pp) over the replies without an unresolved label, access marks whether the character can access the event, and target agreement counts replies where author and scorer agree on target use.
Figure 9: The list-first prompt per model in Study 1 (content and planning questions). (a, b) Net use with the base prompt (gray) and with the list-first prompt. (c) Change in the use of speech made accessible by a working translator, with 95% skeleton-bootstrap intervals and the noninferiority margin of −5 pp.
Model
Main prompt
Boundary-instruction
Minimal
Community
Gemma-4-31B
45.5 [38.9, 52.2]
23.1 [18.3, 28.4]
50.6 [44.3, 57.2]
51.0 [44.7, 57.4]
Qwen3.8-27B
49.6 [43.7, 54.9]
23.0 [18.2, 27.6]
46.9 [41.5, 52.0]
51.8 [46.9, 56.4]
Qwen3.5-9B
83.9 [80.5, 87.0]
84.7 [81.4, 87.8]
93.1 [90.7, 95.1]
95.6 [94.3, 96.9]
Appendix
Table 6: Net use in Study 1 under the language boundary (repertoire only, pp) under three alternative system prompts. The boundary-instruction prompt tells the model to preserve visible knowledge boundaries.
Subset
Reduction (%)
Transl. (pp)
Holm p
Chinese
66.6
-5.1
0.523
Japanese
66.0
-2.8
0.055
Spanish
61.5
2.0
0.004
Without Kerry
62.9
-0.5
0.004
Without Panam
64.1
-0.5
0.004
Without Rogue
67.0
-4.9
0.464
Appendix
Table 7: The list-first test of Study 1 by language, leaving one character out, and with a two-way (skeleton × character) bootstrap. The joint criterion fails in several subsets.
Variant
Not underst.
Not audible
Reduction (%)
Translator (pp)
Supported
Unconditional (no capability filter)
66.5
72.2
64.7
-2.2
8/8
Soft hedge credit
66.7
72.2
64.7
-1.9
8/8
Exclude truncated
66.7
72.2
64.7
-2.0
8/8
Exclude language/echo flags
67.0
72.2
64.8
-2.3
8/8
Complete responses only
66.7
72.2
64.7
-1.9
8/8
Worst-case failed list-first reply
66.7
72.2
64.6
-2.0
8/8
Appendix
Table 8: Study 1 scoring and conditioning sensitivities.
Exploratory contrast
Estimate (pp)
95% CI
BH q
Denial while using the content, prose sentence
4.9
[4.3, 5.5]
0.002
Unattributed use, prose sentence minus no language state
7.6
[5.6, 9.6]
0.002
Offline − absent translator
0.1
[-0.5, 0.7]
0.767
Repertoire minus narrated inaudibility (unmatched)
20.3
[19.1, 21.5]
0.002
Few-shot reduction (4 models)
40.4
[37.6, 43.3]
0.002
Direct address − overheard
8.3
[4.9, 11.6]
0.002
Appendix
Table 9: Study 1 exploratory family (Benjamini–Hochberg, q=.10 ). No language state means the state omits the character’s languages. The world comparison uses different scenario sets.
Table 19
Figure 10: Bridge experiment for all 11 open-weight models. Net use of unheard speech (pp) under Study 2’s hearing prompt (Base), with one Study 1 feature swapped in, and with all four. Outlined cells differ from Base with a paired 95% skeleton-bootstrap interval that excludes zero. The last column gives the range of target use for the same speech when audible (%). (a) 96 discovery scenes. (b) 96 confirmation scenes with each character renamed to a Study 1 persona.
Model
Base
Sys.
Sheet
State
Quest.
All
Claude Sonnet 5.5
0.5
9.9
15.1
8.9
9.4
13.0
Gemini 3.1 Pro
0.0
–
0.0
0.0
–
21.4
Appendix
Table 24: Single-feature swaps for two proprietary models on the discovery hearing prompts (192 unheard prompts per cell, net use in pp). Bold marks a change from Base whose paired 95% interval excludes zero. Gemini 3.1 Pro was run on the two swaps that moved the open-weight models most.
Model
Study 1 prompt
+ channel
+ question
+ minimal
All three
Not-audible flag
Gemma-4-31B
52.1
52.1
51.0
54.7
50.0
Qwen3.8-27B
71.4
74.0
80.2
51.6
32.8
Seed-OSS-36B
90.1
88.0
100.0
87.0
83.3
Phi-4
99.0
100.0
94.3
100.0
94.3
Not-understood flag
Appendix
Table 25: Format ablation from Study 1 toward Study 2 (96 scenes, one language per skeleton, content question). Net use (pp) when one Study 2 feature is added (a field naming the channel, the direct question, a minimal context) and with all three.
Large language model-based role-play simulation creates interactive agents that portray people, characters, or users for training, testing, and research.
Role-playing large language models (LLMs) are expected to adopt a character's style while also respecting that character's knowledge boundaries. Prior evaluations detect character hallucination but rarely distinguish whether errors arise from failure to recognize a boundary or from failure to comply despite recognition. We introduce CHARM, a multicultural benchmark of 40 real and fictional characters drawn from five cultural-linguistic regions, and validated by native reviewers. It probes two boundary types, Temporal (historical vs. modern) and Cross-Universe (entities outside a character's narrative or historical universe), using abstention-enabled multiple-choice questions. We propose a two-stage evaluation that separates Boundary-Awareness (explicit recognition that a query is out of scope) from Boundary-Compliance (abstention when answering concrete questions). Evaluations across six LLMs show that hallucination is driven predominantly by compliance failures. Models frequently acknowledge that a query lies outside the character's knowledge yet still provide factual, out-of-character answers. By re-posing the same questions to the target character, we confirm that a large fraction of these cases are verified parametric overrides; the model stores the relevant fact but fails to suppress it. We also observe systematic cultural variation in these failures, consistent with imbalances in how characters from different regions are represented in model knowledge.
Sunkyung Han, Nahyeon Park, Gaeun Seo +2
Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, South Korea · Adobe Research, CA, USA
Language models can state that "the Earth orbits the Sun" and, when role-playing Aristotle, assert the opposite. Recent work argues that persona adoption is fundamental to how language models behave, with models selecting the most appropriate persona for a given context. Does such role-playing merely change the model's outputs, or does it also affect what the model internally represents as truthful? We study this question using the role-play of characters whose beliefs differ from the modern consensus, and induce personas with a number of different methods: prompting, in-context learning (ICL), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and Open Character Training (OCT), and Emergent Misalignment (EM). We measure belief internalization across these approaches with truth probes and with behavioral tests, finding a broad spectrum of belief internalization. Prompting, ICL, and SFT change what the model says with little representational change. EM creates a large, broad shift in the model's truth representation, and OCT a smaller shift that is clearest on the larger model. Understanding when training changes a model's worldview rather than merely its behavior may become increasingly important as AI systems are entrusted with greater autonomy and influence.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as agents with little human oversight, so potential mistakes they make can go unnoticed. Users then depend on the model to report what went wrong. An honest model discloses its mistakes, while a deceptive one conceals them. However, it is unclear how current LLMs behave in such situations. In this study, we prefill LLM trajectories with synthetic mistakes. The trajectories resemble real deployments in chat and agentic settings. Models fail to disclose their mistake in 36.4% of chat and 67.1% of agentic rollouts. In 2.4% and 5.3% of rollouts, respectively, they are aware of the mistake in their chain of thought but still deceptively conceal it. Rates vary by model: for instance, Gemini 3.5 Flash knowingly conceals mistakes in up to 19.9% of agentic rollouts. In 11.9% of chat and 51.8% of agentic rollouts, models show no awareness of mistakes, even though they reliably spot them when reviewing the same transcript as an outside observer. Our results show that, as agents take on more tasks with less oversight, users cannot rely on them to self-report possible mistakes. Developers should instead use independent monitors that review agent trajectories, or specifically train models to check their past actions and disclose what they find.
Lucas Florin, Amelie Knecht, Ulysse Schaller +1
AI Safety Research Group, University of Stuttgart, Germany