cs.AIOct 13, 2026

When and How Order-Flow Interventions Work After Dealers Adapt

Authors: Guanghao Wu, Zhuo Cai, Zhidong Li, Shoujin Wang

Organizations: University of Technology Sydney Sydney, NSW, Australia

Abstract

Learning dealer agents can settle on persistently wide quotes, raising what customers pay to trade. A venue can route more orders to tighter quotes, but a wide quote may reflect real risk, and once dealers adapt, an end-to-end comparison cannot show why a rule works: because it intervenes more, picks better moments, is announced in advance, or rewards the right quote. We propose SOFA (State-aligned Order-Flow Allocation), a public order-flow contract with three parts: a State Scorer ranks market states from lagged public data, a Commitment Scheduler announces a budgeted intervention strength before dealers quote, and a Quote-to-Flow Allocator shifts a bounded share of fixed customer demand toward tighter quotes. Our paired re-adaptation protocol gives competing rules the same intervention strengths, only re-timed, lets dealers re-adapt to each rule from a shared checkpoint, and breaks one link at a time. Across 20 independently trained dealer populations in an ABIDES market, concentrating the intervention in states that the score ranks as low-risk lowers low-risk execution cost relative to random timing in every population, by 0.040 tick on average, while a stale announcement or a broken quote-to-flow link raises this cost. In the primary setting the gain comes at the expense of high-risk trades, whose costs rise, so state alignment pays off only for a venue that weighs low-risk costs more than 1.38 times as heavily as high-risk costs. Our code is available at https://github.com/moderncavemann/state-aligned-order-flow-contracts.

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