Reading Right, Acting Wrong: Diagnosing Decision Failures of System One Models in Agent Loops

Dual-process agents pair a fast policy with a slow deliberative model. In real-time settings the slow model usually runs continuously; in turn-based agents and robot planners it is invoked on events such as uncertainty or a detected failure. We study a fast learned actor that takes every decision and hands control to a reasoning vision-language model only when a gate opens, while the game keeps running. We use closed-loop Doom and the new open "System One" typed-decision models, served through a common llama.cpp interface. On 900 held-out questions, (i) zero-shot decision models from 0.15B to 9B parameters choose to collect items 1.6-1.8 times more often than chance among their errors, in any option order, although the order changes some models' accuracy; (ii) accuracy, calibration and sensitivity (how well confidence separates right from wrong answers) are distinct: models of similar accuracy differ widely in AUROC, and the confidence of the most sensitive one tracks which kinds of situation it fails, not which answers are wrong; (iii) offline, deferring the least confident 30% of decisions to a reasoning model gains over random deferral in proportion to the actor's AUROC (rank correlation 0.87); with actor and rate chosen on held-out games the gain is +0.13 [0.08, 0.18] with doomLaya's option order and +0.08 [0.02, 0.14] with shuffled options, and reasoning carries about half of it; (iv) in closed loop (33 games, three seeds) no variant reaches the exit. Committing to plans, the reasoner's or a fixed explore rule's, opens more doors and makes an actor that stands still play; with the rule the agent dies more often. Told that some doors need keys, the reasoner takes ordinary doors for locked ones, which the state cannot tell apart; without that knowledge it goes back to collecting. We release code, prompts, data and logs.

Large language models (LLMs) often make discrete decisions, such as flagging phishing or escalating to a human. System-1 models, such as Jev and the OpenAI Decisions API, return probabilities over options in a single forward pass, while System-2 approaches generate reasoning steps. Which decisions can System-1 models handle, and which require generative reasoning? We introduce System1-Arena, a benchmark that gives all models the same decision requests and scores their probabilities. It contains 92k questions across 105 tasks from 268 public sources, in four groups: text classification and knowledge, applied decisions, evaluation and control, and agent and action. It also includes 138 closed-loop environments, from web shopping and SWE-bench coding control to robotics, games, and driving; in real-time mode, the world evolves while a model decides. We evaluate 30 models: 7 closed LLMs, 13 open LLMs read at the answer token, and 10 System-1 models. The largest System-1 models match or exceed fast closed LLMs in non-agentic accuracy, with better-calibrated probabilities at one-quarter of the latency. A reasoning LLM is the most accurate, at about 70x the cost of a fast LLM. In closed loops, large open LLMs succeed most often (up to 32.9%); small System-1 models rarely succeed.

Language model (LM) agents can fail for different reasons, requiring different explanations and interventions. We study how state beliefs, action values, and action preferences interact as LM agents reason and commit to decisions in text-rendered grid worlds. We estimate task-relevant beliefs using report-based and representation-based probes, and action values using inverse reinforcement learning. We find that task-relevant state and value information is often represented more reliably than it is reflected in behaviour. Tracking action preferences throughout reasoning further shows that decisions sharpen around a commitment point and reported belief uncertainty decreases near commitment, although individual belief changes do not consistently explain shifts in action preference. Finally, forced actions follow reasoning prefixes from other decisions when transplanted, whereas the tested reasoning-window activation edits provide limited control over the action. Together, these results suggest that some failures arise not from missing task-relevant information, but from how available information is translated into action. Our measurements distinguish information availability from belief-action consistency without by themselves identifying the cause of each failure. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/belief-action-gap-F745/