What do AI chatbots do after users decline therapeutic redirection for suicide thoughts?
Authors: Subigya Nepal, Ruth Heo, Emma M Parrish, Colin A Depp
Organizations: Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville (Nepal) · Department of Psychiatry, University of California San Diego, La Jolla (Heo, Parrish, Depp) · VA San Diego Healthcare System, San Diego, California (Parrish)
Safety evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots focus on therapeutic redirection, statements urging users who disclose suicide thoughts to seek help from crisis lines or other human sources. How chatbots respond when users refuse that help is unclear. This cross-sectional audit ran 2,550 scripted multi-turn conversations in September 2026. Each conversation opened with a disclosure of suicide thoughts at 3 levels of severity, answered every referral with up to 10 standardized refusals and then changed the subject. All 2,550 conversations included a referral, 2,542 (99.7%) in the first reply. However, mean persistence ranged from 0.01 to 9.94 refusals across chatbots. Newer versions of all 5 chatbots tested in 2 versions persisted less than older versions (each P < .05). Compared with passive ideation, a disclosure of intent was associated with 1.26 more refusals sustained (95% CI, 1.06-1.46) and higher odds of renewed referral after the topic change (odds ratio, 10.07; 95% CI, 7.43-13.66). Chatbots that persisted less in referral more often presented themselves as the user's support (Spearman rho = -0.80; P < .001). Of 8,818 refusal-phase replies urging outside help, only 173 (2.0%) asked about barriers to seeking it. Chatbots uniformly recommended outside help after disclosures of suicide thoughts but varied widely in persisting in those recommendations, with newer versions persisting less. Safety evaluations should test what happens after a crisis referral is refused, not only whether one is offered.
Millions of people now use generative AI chatbots for psychological support. Despite their promise, the most pressing question in AI for mental health is whether these tools are safe. The field currently lacks a validated, automated benchmark for evaluating AI chatbot safety, particularly for users at risk of suicide. The Validation of Ethical and Responsible AI in Mental Health (VERA-MH) evaluation was recently proposed to address this need. This human validation study examined the alignment of VERA-MH safety ratings with expert clinician judgments. We simulated conversations between large language model (LLM)-based users spanning a range of suicide risk levels and disclosure styles and general-purpose AI chatbots. Licensed mental health clinicians from Spring Health independently rated chatbot safety using the VERA-MH scoring rubric. An LLM-based evaluator ("judge") applied the same rubric to the same conversations. We examined agreement among clinicians, between clinician consensus and the LLM judge, and across different judge LLMs. Clinicians also rated user-agent realism, suicide risk, and disclosure. Clinicians showed strong agreement in safety ratings (chance-corrected inter-rater reliability [IRR] = 0.77), establishing a reliable clinical consensus reference. The LLM judge was strongly aligned with this consensus (IRR = 0.81), and ratings were stable across judge models and repeated evaluations. Ratings of user-agent realism and fidelity to intended suicide risk and disclosure styles were mixed. These findings support the reliability of VERA-MH as an open-source, fully automated benchmark for evaluating AI chatbot suicide risk detection and response. Because these results reflect an earlier version of the benchmark, future work should validate updated versions, assess generalizability and robustness, and expand VERA-MH to additional domains of AI safety in mental health.
Chatbot usage has increased, including in fields for which they were never developed for--notably mental health support. To that end, we introduce Validations of Ethical and Responsible AI in Mental Health (VERA-MH), a novel clinically-validated evaluation for safety of chatbots in the context of mental health support. The first iteration of VERA-MH focuses on Suicidal Ideation (SI) risks, by assessing how well chatbots can responds to users that might be in crisis. VERA-MH is comprised of three steps: conversation simulation, conversation judging and model rating. First, to simulate conversations with the chatbot under evaluation, another chatbot is tasked with role-playing users based on specific personas. Such user personas have been developed under clinical guidance, to make sure that, among others, multiple risk factors, demographic characteristics and disclosure factors were represented. In the judging step, a second support model is used as an LLM-as-a-Judge, together with a clinically-developed rubric. The rubric is structured as a flow, with a single Yes/No question asked each time, to improve answers' consistency and highlight models' failure modes. In the last stage, results of each conversation are aggregated to present the final evaluation of the chatbot. Together with the framework, we present the result of the evaluations for four leading LLM providers.
Refusal is a common safety mechanism in large language models (LLMs), yet in contexts of suicidal ideation (SI), refusing to engage can itself constitute a safety failure. We evaluate how eight instruction-tuned LLMs respond to SI and self-harm disclosures across three datasets, varying whether models are informed that a disclosure expresses SI and whether they receive a clinician-developed response protocol, and complement this with mechanistic analyses in six open-weight models. Our results reveal a nuanced relationship between refusal and response-level risk. At baseline, elevated risk in model responses is driven primarily by inattention to the disclosure, alongside refusal to engage. Mechanistic analyses suggest that models may refuse SI disclosures through the same direction that mediates their refusals of harmful requests. However, informing models of the SI context, or suppressing refusal directly, increases engagement without reliably lowering response risk, and may raise it. In contrast, the clinician-guided protocol consistently reduces response-level risk while also reducing refusal. Together, these analyses and ablations motivate the need for models that refuse only when warranted and engage in interactionally safe ways when users disclose SI.
Drishti Goel, Soorya Ram Shimgekar, Jeongah Lee +4
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA · University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA · OSF HealthCare