Honesty is the Best Policy ... or is it? Demand Management for Probabilistic Service Options

Demand management policies aim to shift individual behavior toward sustainable choices (e.g., goods, transport modes). Personalized incentive policies tailor subsidies to agents' needs and constraints, but personalization also exposes the regulator to agents' strategic manipulative behavior. The extent to which agents can profitably manipulate such policies remains poorly understood, which limits their applicability. This paper establishes analytically the conditions under which manipulation benefits the agent. We formalize a Stackelberg game in which an agent may simulate a different profile to extract higher incentives from a regulator. Previous work typically assumes that the regulator would instantaneously classify agents into the simulated user profile. In contrast, we explicitly model the regulator's process of learning the agent profile, based on observed past behavior. This makes manipulation harder, since it forces the agent to consistently behave according to a simulated profile, thus renouncing following their true preferences. Manipulative agents thus incur a Cost of Manipulation, which has typically been neglected. By accounting for it, we get a counterintuitive finding: although classification uncertainty reduces personalization accuracy, it may benefit the regulator by deterring manipulation. We establish an upper bound on the agent's gain from manipulation, which becomes stricter as profiles become harder to distinguish for the regulator. Simulations on the London Passenger Mode Choice dataset illustrate this deterrence effect. The framework can therefore be used to stress-test the robustness of personalized incentive policies before deployment.

Firms that price perishable resources -- airline seats, hotel rooms, seasonal inventory -- now routinely use demand predictions, but these predictions vary widely in quality. Under hard capacity constraints, acting on an inaccurate prediction can irreversibly deplete inventory needed for future periods. We study how prediction uncertainty propagates into dynamic pricing decisions with linear demand, stochastic noise, and finite capacity. A certified demand forecast with known error bound~$ε^0$ specifies where the system should operate: it shifts regret from $O(\sqrt{T})$ to $O(\log T)$ when $ε^0 \lesssim T^{-1/4}$, and we prove this threshold is tight. A misspecified surrogate model -- biased but correlated with true demand -- cannot set prices directly but reduces learning variance by a factor of $(1-ρ^2)$ through control variates. The two mechanisms compose: the forecast determines the regret regime; the surrogate tightens estimation within it. All algorithms rest on a boundary attraction mechanism that stabilizes pricing near degenerate capacity boundaries without requiring non-degeneracy assumptions. Experiments confirm the phase transition threshold, the variance reduction from surrogates, and robustness across problem instances.

We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of $\Tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}\wedgeσ_S^{-2})$. Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.