Agent Transfer Protocol: Server-Mediated Agent-to-Agent Communication Architecture for the Agentic Web
Organizations: Nankai University Tianjin, China · Tsinghua University Beijing, China · Quancheng Laboratory Jinan, China
Abstract
The Agentic Web needs to support continuous collaboration among agents from different organizations. These collaborative relationships may span multiple tasks, network connections and execution instances. Such interactions require stable communication entries, message reception when instances are offline, and source verification after delayed reading. How to organize these responsibilities so that cross domain communication does not depend on specific execution instances being continuously online is a key issue for building long term agent interaction infrastructure. We propose ATP (Agent Transfer Protocol), a cross organization agent communication protocol adopting a domain mediated architecture. In this architecture, administrative domains maintain stable addresses and receiving entries for logical agents. The domain servers of both parties continuously undertake cross domain transmission. The receiving domain verifies and saves messages for execution instances to read later. The sending domain signs the complete message envelope. This allows the receiving instance to independently reverify the domain source and content integrity after the original connection ends, provided the original verification public key is still trusted and obtainable. We implemented an ATP prototype and evaluated it through a controlled cross organization LLM agent workflow, mechanism checks and latency measurements. The workflow completed subsequent business processing after instances went offline or were replaced. The independent verifier successfully verified the domain source and content integrity of saved messages. Latency measurements further quantified the communication and processing overhead introduced by the continuous mediation of domain servers.
Figures & tables
| Variant | Offline | Migration |
|---|---|---|
| Success | 5/5 | 5/5 |
| Total Time (s) | 407.6 | 406.7 |
| Offline (s) | 360.7 | 361.1 |
| Model (s) | 35.0 | 34.3 |
| Business Tool (s) | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| ATP send/recv (s) | 0.13 / 0.08 | 0.13 / 0.10 |
| Check | Observation Result for Each Time | Pass |
|---|---|---|
| Retrieve after offline (600 seconds) | 20/20 messages received, no missing, duplication or content error | 5/5 |
| Address unchanged after migration | 20/20 new messages fetched on new IP, old batch not fetched repeatedly | 5/5 |
| Independent reverification of signature | 20/20 signatures passed verification | 5/5 |
| Tampering detection | 60/60 modified envelopes rejected | 5/5 |
| Two agents on one server | 20/20 messages each, no inbox mixing | 5/5 |
| Test Case | Rejected by Which Check (Status Code) | Pass |
|---|---|---|
| Forged signature | Signature check (403) | 3/3 |
| Tampered content | Signature check (403) | 3/3 |
| Use other domain key | Domain consistency (403) | 3/3 |
| Unauthorized source address | ATS policy (403) | 3/3 |
| Forged source request header | ATS policy (403) | 3/3 |
| Replay | Replay prevention cache (400) | 3/3 |
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Response | Meaning | Sender action |
|---|---|---|
| 202 | Written to the recipient’s inbox | Delivered |
| Network error, 408, 429, 5xx | Temporary failure | Retry with backoff within the window |
| 400 TIMESTAMP_OUT_OF_WINDOW , 504 DEADLINE_EXCEEDED | Expired | Expired |
| 400 NONCE_REPLAYED | Already accepted | Delivered if the last attempt was uncertain, else permanent failure |
| Other 4xx (e.g., 403 bad signature, 404 unknown recipient) | Permanent failure | Stop |
| Case | Construction | Rejected by | Response | Inbox | Passed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forged signature | Sign with a random key | ATK signature verification | 403 ATK_SIGNATURE_INVALID | Absent | 3/3 |
| Tampered content | Modify a captured payload | ATK signature verification | 403 ATK_SIGNATURE_INVALID | No new copy | 3/3 |
| Sender/key domain mismatch | Sign noats.example as evil.example | Domain alignment | 403 ATK_SIGNATURE_INVALID | Absent | 3/3 |
| Disallowed source address | Replay from attacker host | ATS policy | 403 ATS_VALIDATION_FAILED | No new copy | 3/3 |
| Spoofed source headers | Forge X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP | ATS policy | 403 ATS_VALIDATION_FAILED | No new copy | 3/3 |
| Replay | Resend the same sender/nonce | Replay cache | 400 NONCE_REPLAYED | No new copy | 3/3 |
Agent Communication Protocols
Agent communication protocols define how AI agents discover one another, exchange messages and state, coordinate tasks, and enforce trust.
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