Fast, Cheap, and Fair? Evaluating Decision Models

Job applicants increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to write cover letters, while employers deploy LLMs to screen them. In this all-AI setting, we ask whether the choice of model affects hiring outcomes independently of candidate qualifications. We introduce a multi-model auditing framework pairing eleven LLM writer agents with nine API-hosted evaluator agents across ten job descriptions and fifty candidates per job. Four findings emerge. First, we identify a generative preference hierarchy: a consistent global ranking of writer models by evaluator acceptance, in which locally hosted models are systematically disadvantaged regardless of their license, compounded by self-preference bias where evaluators favour their own outputs. Second, evaluator models differ substantially in how much bias they introduce based on applicants' tool choice, offering actionable guidance for fairer screening design. Third, this hierarchy has measurable competitive consequences: in the most adverse pairing, approximately two (1.8) out of twenty-five qualified candidates are filtered out purely due to model mismatch. Fourth, a common mechanism explains the patterns above: writer preference and self-preference trace to a combination of how much each writer leans on specific stylistic cues and how strongly evaluators, often unanimously, reward or penalise those same cues. A further check finds little evidence that an unmeasured "writer fingerprint" remains once these same features are accounted for. We discuss implications for algorithmic fairness in employment, regulation of AI-assisted screening, and the design of auditing frameworks that can be reapplied as the model landscape evolves.

Whether a language model looks demographically biased can depend on how the audit asks its question. A charitable-aid benchmark reports that the same models favor minority applicants when rating requests one at a time and penalize some when ranking side by side. We test whether that reversal generalizes to hiring, lending, and medical triage: 40,726 requests to five models, applications differing only in the applicant's name, and a primary test fixed before collection. It does not. None of 36 planned contrasts survives correction. The rating advantage keeps its sign at roughly half the published size, and a precision extension bounds any hiring ranking penalty below the published effect, though the lending and triage ranking floors sit above that margin, so the exclusion is conclusive for hiring ranking and for rating in all three domains only. Planted disparities tracking their injected sizes and a directional replication on the original aid materials bound these nulls. The audit is livelier than the demographics: models recognize transparent audits nearly always, tie every identical-content comparison whether the varying detail is race or a hobby, and reward first-listed candidates as much as any demographic effect we measure. Audit verdicts reflect audit construction more than demographic bias.

Automated candidate-job matching systems are increasingly classified as high-risk AI under emerging regulation, yet auditing them for demographic bias is expensive: classical correspondence-audit studies require hand-crafted resumes and manual submission, which does not scale to fast pipeline retraining cycles. This paper presents a general, reusable methodology that (1) uses task-specialized LLM agents to synthesize identity-neutral base resumes and inject controlled demographic treatments across five protected-characteristic axes (sex/gender, age, residence, language, disability), producing a K x (1+N) correspondence-audit matrix; (2) qualitatively flags inferred protected characteristics per an EU AI Act-aligned prompt; (3) ranks candidates against a job description via a fine-tuned sentence-embedding model and cosine similarity; and (4) computes a nine-metric fairness suite spanning counterfactual (score delta, mean absolute rank change, flip rate), group-fairness (top-K retention, four-fifths/impact ratio), and merit-aware (Recall@K, nDCG@K, equal opportunity, equalized odds) families, each with bootstrap confidence intervals, significance tests, and Benjamini-Hochberg correction, culminating in an automated PASS/INVESTIGATE/FAIL report with a composite risk score. On an example corpus of 5 job orders, 100 base candidates, and 10 demographic treatments (90 metric x variant evaluations): score shifts, top-K retention, and merit-aware rate gaps stay within tolerance for every treatment, but a rank-stability metric (MARC) and nDCG@K each surface borderline findings - including one on the neutral baseline itself - that a score- or retention-only view would miss. The results argue for multi-metric, multi-family auditing over any single aggregate score, and for LLM-agent-generated audits as a practical, low-cost complement to human-curated audits for any candidate-job matching pipeline.