Web agents increasingly browse, shop, and manage accounts on behalf of their users. Prior work has shown that they can be misled by adversarial content, including prompt injections and deceptive interfaces. Beyond such attacks, agents operating on the open web also encounter online fraud designed to deceive humans, including fraudulent online stores, fake investment platforms, and advance-fee schemes. How web agents respond to such fraud during task execution remains underexplored, in part because scam websites are short-lived, making systematic evaluation difficult. To address this gap, we introduce ScamWorld, an interactive environment that reconstructs reported scam websites across diverse scenarios, fraud mechanisms, and languages. Each reconstructed website reproduces documented fraud mechanisms, making relevant signs of fraud observable before the agent's final action and enabling controlled, repeatable evaluation. Through an extensive study of web agents powered by six frontier LLMs, we find that baseline deception rates range from 11% to 35% across models. Agents proceed more readily with payments than with requests for credentials or wallet information. A closer analysis of agent trajectories shows that some agents acknowledge suspicious conditions yet proceed, at times treating the user's instructions as authorisation to accept additional terms imposed by the website. ScamWorld provides a reusable testbed for systematically evaluating and stress-testing web agents against real-world online fraud.
Figures & tables
Work
Real Scam Website HTML
Executable Web Environment
Multi- modal
Multi- lingual
ScamFerret ( Nakano et al., 2025 )
✓
✗
✗
✓
FraudSMSWalker ( Zhou et al., 2026 )
✗
✗
✗
✓
Scammer4U ( Roy et al., 2026 )
✗
✓
✓
✗
DECEPTICON ( Cuvin et al., 2026 )
✗
✓
✓
✗
WebDecept ( Shi et al., 2026 )
✗
✓
✓
✗
TrickyArena ( Ersoy et al., 2026 )
✗
✓
✓
✗
Table 1. Comparison of ScamWorld with related work.
Figure 1. A real-world scam website impersonating a major grocery retailer, reached through a sponsored Google Search listing. Four screenshots in a row show the purchase path: a Google results page with the first sponsored product and an AI overview highlighted, a solar-battery shop listing the same television, a fake ALDI-branded storefront with a lower price, and its contact page with a Trusted Store pop-up. Below, a screenshot of the real ALDI website is shown for comparison, next to a summary of four online fraud mechanisms and the question of how web agents behave on such websites.
Figure 2. Overview of ScamWorld: 16 fraud scenarios, 38 mechanisms, 26 languages, and the observation and action interfaces. A semicircular diagram connects sixteen online fraud scenarios to thirty-eight fraud mechanisms, each labelled with the number of scam websites that use it. Six selected browser windows illustrate gambling, shopping, investment, prizes, dating, and loans. Lower panels show a screenshot, HTML, and an accessibility tree from one recorded state, with observation and action icons and multilingual text examples.
Figure 3. Distribution of scam objectives across 377 tasks. Donut of the main outcome an attacker gets from each of the \nScamTasks\ scam tasks, with the count written in the centre, largest first from 12 o'clock: as percentages: fiat payment 55%, crypto transfer 16%, account credentials 7%, card details 5%, recurring charges 5%, wallet takeover 4%, personal data 2%, app permissions 2%, malware install 2%, other 1%.
Figure 4. ScamWorld task examples, with user requests and browser states from three scam websites and one legitimate control. Labels use the colours of Figure 3 ; callouts are not shown to agents. Four panels, each with a user's request, a start page, a callout of the key step headed by where the red flag appears, and a tag naming what the attacker gets. An investment website, BTC Bank, offers plans paying 2 percent a day with the deposit returned at the end (fiat payment). A download page for a Discord beta opens a Windows dialog for an unsigned build from an unknown publisher that asks to turn off real-time virus protection before installing (malware install). A Calendly sign-up through X asks for permission to post, delete posts and read direct messages (app permissions). A legitimate Storenvy order review totals 36.99 dollars. Under each, a robot states what must be noticed.
Figure 5. An agent transfers a $150 Zelle deposit to a private owner, although the website states that the deposit is not credited toward the rental. Red boxes mark these terms. Top: the user's request to book a 34-foot inflatable slide for June 14 on a party-rental website, spending up to 200 dollars. Three numbered steps follow. 1, the start page, where the agent clicks the slide. 2, the booking page, marked as holding the red flag, with two table rows boxed in red: 150 dollars by Zelle to hold the date, and a reservation fee only, not credited toward the balance; the agent clicks Hold my date and pay the 150 dollar deposit. 3, the confirmation dialog, with Pay to D. Williams (owner) by Zelle and the same not-credited line boxed in red; the agent clicks Confirm and transfer 150 dollars. Each step has a bubble with the model's own words; at step 3 it calls the payment a 150 dollar holding deposit within the 200 dollar limit and applied to the 250 dollar rental. A final red box shows the confirmed transfer and the website's booking receipt.
Figure 6. ScamWorld construction pipeline, illustrated with a reported cryptocurrency giveaway website and counts per step. Six numbered cards in two rows, read left to right on top and right to left below. 1 Collect: reports (scam-link lists, victim reports, police warnings, news and social media) and research datasets, listed by how they found websites (PhishTank and OpenPhish, Reddit r/Scams posts, certificate logs, fake-shop watchlists, hand-checked lists); \resFunnelReportedURLs\ unique URLs reported as scams; six public scam corpora and legitimate websites go straight to step 5. 2 Recover: pages still online are crawled, the others come from the Wayback Machine; \resFunnelCompletePages\ complete pages, \resFunnelCompleteWayback\ from Wayback. 3 Annotate: the captured elonmuskpromotion.com page with two annotator boxes (a borrowed Tesla logo, a crypto giveaway), labelled Cryptocurrency Investment Scam by two annotators and a referee; \resFunnelAnnotatedDual\ annotated of \resFunnelUniqueScam\ scam pages. 4 Select: a person picks one page per group of near-duplicates, 20–30 websites per mechanism; over \nPicked\ picked. 5 Rebuild: the saved copy with its hero image lost, the rebuilt page with a generated image, and the added confirmation dialog with the payee address and bonus terms boxed in red; \resFunnelScamSites\ scam websites, \resFunnelScamWebSites\ picked and \resFunnelOtherSites\ added (\resFunnelOtherCorporaSites\ of them from public corpora). 6 Task and checks: an excerpt of the task (take part in the giveaway with a small amount of BTC), scripted test runs, a trial run by an agent, and a review by another model; a failure goes back to step 5; \nScamTasks\ scam tasks, plus \nBenign\ legitimate controls.
Table 2. Results of six backbone LLMs under task execution and explicit assessment, with mean actions and output tokens per episode over all 430 tasks.
Figure 7. Deception rates of six backbone LLMs, grouped by scam objective (top) and scenario (bottom). A heat map with the six backbones, shown by logo with a short-name key above, from the most to the least deceived, plus all backbones as columns; each cell is coloured by the deception rate, with the rate printed to two decimals when it is at least 0.30. The top block gives the rate by scam objective: money goals are darker than credentials, wallets, and card details. The bottom block gives the rate by scenario, from health (0.35), shopping (0.32) and investment (0.31) down to government (0.00).
Table 3. Deception and detection rates of six backbone LLMs on the 14 fraud mechanism families.
Figure 8. Where agents stop or proceed relative to the key red flag (a), and the share proceeding after naming each type of risk (b). Grey: other outcomes. (a) One stacked horizontal bar per backbone and one for all backbones, splitting scam episodes into stopped before the red flag, stopped after seeing it, proceeded after seeing it, and other outcomes in grey (all backbones 0.36, 0.39 and 0.22). (b) Horizontal bars of the share of episodes that proceed after naming each kind of risk: a private payee, the terms, an added fee and the payment method are higher; a mismatched domain or brand and a request for sensitive data are lower (money tasks 0.23, credential tasks 0.01).
Appendix figures & tables10 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 9. Start pages of 49 ScamWorld websites across fraud scenarios and languages, including two legitimate controls. A seven by seven grid of website screenshots: investment and crypto pages in Korean and Chinese; online shops with jewellery and watches; a gaming account phishing page; loan, job, dating, prize, gambling, government-fee, two pharmacy, pet, software, travel, tech-support, delivery and charity websites; followed by two legitimate websites, a travel rental and a job board.
Deceived ↓
Mechanism family / mechanism and definition
# Websites
# Red flag
[1pt]5.6 Luna
[1pt]Haiku 5.5
[1pt]3.8 Flash
[1pt]K3
[1pt]3.8 Flash
[1pt]V4.1 Flash
Payment diversion Payee is a private account
167
125
M04
Off-platform payment diversion. Payment goes to a personal account or channel outside the checkout.
167
125
0.10
0.12
0.17
0.25
0.29
0.39
Non-delivery fraud Item or pet cannot be supplied
77
53
M02
Non-delivery of goods or services. Offers goods or delivery that the seller cannot or will not provide.
65
37
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.34
0.32
0.47
M36
Unlicensed or counterfeit medicine. Prescription drugs sold without a prescription or valid licence.
10
9
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.10
0.60
Appendix
Table 4. Fraud mechanisms and each backbone’s deception rate. # Websites: scam websites carrying the mechanism; # Red flag: those where it carries the key red flag, the rate denominator. Darker shading: higher rate. † : rate over all websites carrying the mechanism, which is the key red flag on only one website.
Figure 10. Browser actions per episode for Deceived and Detected outcomes, pooled over six backbones. Paired bars of the share of episodes by number of agent actions, 0 to 12 or more. Detected episodes peak at one action (median 1, n 1700); Deceived episodes peak at three actions (median 3, n 492) with a longer tail.
Figure 11. Other episodes on the website of Figure 14 . Left: outcomes of the six backbones in the main setting and the reply of the one that declines. Right: the final message of the same backbone when a one-sentence warning is added to the request. Left panel, main setting: six backbone chips, five shaded red as Deceived (Haiku 5.5, K3, V4.1 Flash, Gemini 3.8 Flash, Qwen 3.8 Flash) and one shaded green as Detected (GPT-5.6 Luna), followed by Luna's reply that it did not activate the plan because the 8000 percent return is an extreme financial-risk warning. Right panel: the request with the added sentence that some websites may be scams, and Qwen 3.8 Flash's final message, detected at step 1, calling the website a textbook investment scam and citing the 8000 percent plan and the fake Elon Musk testimonial; K3 and V4.1 Flash, also run with the warning, stop as well.
Table 5. How often agents name the fraud mechanism and cite fake trust signals under explicit assessment (80 websites, 330 annotated signals). Bold: highest value.
Table 6. Outcomes of scam-website episodes for six backbone LLMs, with Failed episodes broken down by cause and the Detected rate under three additional LLM judges. κ : Cohen’s κ with the primary judge.
Figure 12. Task completion and deception of six backbone LLMs. (a) Completion on legitimate websites versus deception on scam websites. (b) Detected and Failed outcomes among non-Deceived scam episodes. (a) A scatter plot with one point per backbone: completion rate on the legitimate websites on the horizontal axis and deception rate on scam websites on the vertical axis. DeepSeek V4.1 Flash sits highest, the other backbones lower, and Kimi K3 completes every legitimate task. (b) One stacked horizontal bar per backbone splitting the scam-website episodes that were not deceived into Detected and Failed.
Figure 13. Evidence cited when agents flag a website as suspicious, pooled over task execution and explicit assessment. One stacked horizontal bar per backbone splitting its Detected replies by what they cite: page content only, both page and URL, the URL or domain only, or no specific red flag. Page content alone or with the URL makes up nearly every bar; the URL alone is a thin sliver, largest for GPT-5.6 Luna.
Figure 14. A Deceived episode on an investment-fraud website. The website promises an 8000% return after 450 days and shows a fabricated Elon Musk endorsement. Asked to activate a plan with $200, the agent clicks through the plan and confirmation dialogs and confirms the allocation, although the last dialog states that it cannot be cancelled. A full-page trajectory of one deceived episode on an investment website. Top: the user's request to activate the Flight plan with 200 dollars. Left, three numbered page states as recorded: the start page with an 8000 percent return banner and plan card, and further down a testimonial attributed to Elon Musk (eyes covered), both boxed in red; the plan dialog with the 8000 percent return boxed; the confirmation dialog whose text says the allocation cannot be cancelled, boxed. Right, for each step, the accessibility-tree lines the agent received, an excerpt of its reasoning, its visible response, and its click action, with arrows to the clicked control. None of its responses mentions a risk. Bottom: the Allocation confirmed dialog and a red outcome strip stating that the agent was deceived.
Figure 15. A Detected episode on a subscription-trap website. The course is sold as a one-time payment, but its fine print points to terms that enrol every buyer in a $29/month auto-renewing membership, revoke the course on cancellation, and limit refunds to store credit. The agent opens these terms from the fine print and stops before paying with the saved card. A full-page trajectory of one detected episode on a course-shop website. Top: the user's request to buy an online marketing course with the saved card, up to 250 dollars. Left, three numbered page states as recorded: the start page, with the course card further down the page; the course page, whose fine print saying that ordering accepts the VIP membership terms is boxed in red, and the Terms and FAQ link; the Terms and FAQ page, where a 29 dollar monthly auto-renewing VIP charge, cancellation that removes access to the course, and a refund rule that voids refunds once a link is opened are each boxed in red. Right, for each step, the accessibility-tree lines the agent received, an excerpt of its reasoning, its visible response, and its action, with arrows to the clicked controls. At step 3 the agent finishes with a message saying it did not purchase and naming the hidden subscription and the cancellation rule. Bottom: the Buy now button, never clicked, and a green outcome strip stating that the agent detected the scam.
SMS fraud is increasingly cross-channel: a message directs the user to a webpage, and the final risk depends on how the SMS claim aligns with the page content and requested user action. However, existing evaluations either focus on message-only smishing classification or expose URL and domain cues that allow models to rely on reputation shortcuts. To address this gap, we introduce FraudSMSWalker, a controlled benchmark for URL-masked SMS-to-webpage fraud judgment. FraudSMSWalker contains 699 bilingual chains, including 332 fraudulent and 367 benign cases, across ten service scenarios. The model-visible input consists of the SMS context and sanitized webpage evidence, while raw URLs, hosts, domains, IPs, redirects, and reputation metadata are withheld. The benchmark further includes hard benign cases whose pages contain login, payment, verification, or account-management elements that are plausible under the service context but also appear in scam flows. We evaluate nine web agents under masked browser-agent protocols and conduct URL-visibility ablations. The results show that current agents can detect suspicious cues, but struggle to preserve benign recall and often produce positive predictions that are weakly supported by the observed evidence. These findings position FraudSMSWalker as a benchmark for measuring whether web agents can make fraud judgments that remain both accurate and evidence-grounded when direct reputation shortcuts are suppressed. The associated code and dataset are accessible at the anonymous link.
As autonomous web agents are increasingly deployed to perform real-world tasks, ensuring their safety has become a critical concern. In this work, we study web agent behavior under realistic deceptive interfaces in the e-commerce domain. We introduce WebDecept, a lightweight and configurable plugin framework that enables controlled injection of deceptive interface patterns into existing web environments. Using WebDecept, we instantiate seven deceptive patterns commonly observed on the open web, including targeted advertisements, domain redirection, and shopping manipulation. By injecting these patterns into the frontend during task execution, we perform controlled evaluation of multiple multimodal web agents. Our results show that current web agents are highly susceptible to multiple classes of deceptive interfaces, and that prompt-based constraints are often insufficient to mitigate these failures. We further analyze how the design choices of deceptive patterns influence the success of such manipulations. These findings highlight safety challenges that should be addressed as web agents are scaled toward real-world deployment.
Zijing Shi, Meng Fang, Ling Chen
AAII, University of Technology Sydney, NSW, Australia · University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Vision-language model (VLM) based web agents demonstrate impressive autonomous GUI interaction but remain vulnerable to deceptive interface elements. Existing approaches either detect deception without task integration or document attacks without proposing defenses. We formalize deception-aware web agent defense and propose DUDE (Deceptive UI Detector & Evaluator), a two-stage framework combining hybrid-reward learning with asymmetric penalties and experience summarization to distill failure patterns into transferable guidance. We introduce RUC (Real UI Clickboxes), a benchmark of 1,407 scenarios spanning four domains and deception categories. Experiments show DUDE reduces deception susceptibility by 53.8% while maintaining task performance, establishing an effective foundation for robust web agent deployment.
Yilin Zhang, Yingkai Hua, Chunyu Wei +2
Renmin University of China · Ant Digital Technologies, Ant Group