cs.AINov 6, 2026

PHISHREV+: An ASP-Based Post-Hoc Defeasible Machine Learning Framework for Phishing Detection

Authors: Mainak Sen, Kumar Sanka Ray, Amlan Chakrabarti

Organizations: Computer Science & Engineering Department, Techno India University, West Bengal, EM 4, Salt Lake, Kolkata, 700091, West Bengal, India · A.K.Choudhury School of Information Technology, University of Calcutta, JD 2, Sector 3, Kolkata, 700106, West Bengal, India · ECSU Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203, B. T Road, Kolkata, 700108, West Bengal, India · Department of Artificial Intelligence, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, Kolkata, 721302, West Bengal, India

Abstract

Phishing website detection remains a critical cybersecurity challenge. Although machine learning classifiers achieve high accuracy on benchmark datasets, they suffer from a fundamental limitation: once trained, their decision boundaries are fixed and cannot incorporate new contextual evidence without retraining the model. This work presents PHISHREV+, a hybrid framework that instantiates the notion of post-hoc defeasible machine learning. This framework does not replace the classifier. It treats the initial classifier predictions as defeasible beliefs and revises them through an Answer Set Programming based non-monotonic reasoning(NMR) layer. The framework operates in two phases. In the machine learning phase, four classifiers (SVM, KNN, DT and RF) are trained on the 87 feature benchmark dataset. In the post-hoc NMR phase, four defeasible rules derived from exploratory data analysis of the training set, and validated through Chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests, formally revise initial predictions. The proposed framework achieves consistent false positive reduction across all our classifiers SVM (41→\rightarrow39), KNN (47→\rightarrow46), DT (62→\rightarrow61), and RF (52→\rightarrow51) while maintaining complete false negative parity with zero increase overhead. A comprehensive ablation studies across seven rule configurations confirms that the hierarchical combination of all four defeasible rules is necessary to achieve this optimal balance. Instance level explainability is provided through eXplainable ASP (XASP), which generates formal derivation graphs showing which defeasible rules fired and why the initial belief was retracted, a capability absent from all existing phishing detection approaches.

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