cs.CLNov 6, 2026

On the Effectiveness and Limitations of Open-Weight LLMs for Low-Resource Offensive Language Detection in Danish

Authors: Elnur Adl Zarabi, Amit Kumar, Adi Singh, Sierra Nelson, Megan Stubbs-Richardson, Taoran Ji

Organizations: Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi · Mississippi State University · University of Miami

Abstract

We study the effectiveness and robustness of open-weight large language models (LLMs) for Danish offensive language detection, an underexplored low-resource task. We evaluate four model families (Llama, Mistral, Gemma, and Qwen) across eleven prompting strategies spanning five design categories, cross-prompt generalization, Danish orthographic variation, and robustness under balanced and naturally imbalanced class distributions. We compare against three BERT-family baselines with distinct pre-training strategies, evaluated via both masked language model prompting and supervised fine-tuning. Even without task-specific fine-tuning, LLMs can surpass all three fine-tuned BERT baselines, and lightweight finetuning yields substantial further gains. No single model or prompt category dominates, underscoring that prompt design interacts with model pre-training in ways that cannot be predicted a priori. Semantically grounded prompts transfer more robustly, while format-constrained patterns consistently fail to generalize. ASCII transliteration of Danish-specific characters (æ, ø, å) generally degrades performance, indicating these characters encode meaningful signal. At the same time, the gap between a balanced test set (best F1 of 0.84) and the corpus's natural class skew (0.62 trained on skewed data, 0.70 trained on balanced data) -- relative drops of 26.2% and 16.7% -- shows that class imbalance remains a critical open challenge. Our code and configurations are available at https://github.com/PASHAADC/Danish-LLM-HateSpeech.

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