cs.CRNov 6, 2026

Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS

Authors: Md Ariful Haque, Sander Vinberg, Ben Edwards, João Cruz

Organizations: Bitsight Technologies, Boston, MA, USA

Abstract

Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).

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