cs.CRNov 8, 2026

ErosionBench: Probing Alignment Decay in Enterprise Multi-Agent Systems

Authors: Riya Bharathwaj, Akshara Prabhakar, Roshan Ram, Avni Kothari, Sarah Tan, Huan Wang, Silvio Savarese

Organizations: Salesforce AI Research · Georgia Institute of Technology · Independent Researcher

Abstract

As enterprises delegate consequential work to multi-agent LLM systems, benign-looking requests can escalate into unsafe actions as they propagate across sessions through poisoned shared state, long-context documents, and trusted peer messages: no single message is malicious, yet the assembled tool action is. Prior benchmarks isolate a single agent under prompt injection or score multi-agent attacks by their final output, leaving cross-session erosion of shared state out of scope. We introduce ErosionBench, an environment-grounded benchmark that executes such attacks and verifies alignment decay at the process level, scoring the realized tool call against authorized intent and provenance with deterministic contracts, not output text. Each scenario is authored as a deterministic state graph before any prose is rendered, so every state change traces to a known cause. It spans four enterprise domains and four decay mechanisms across 1,728 scenarios with matched benign controls, labeled against the OWASP Top-10 for LLM Applications, plus 198 image-based attacks, each paired with a text equivalent, so a defense must survive the same attack in either channel. Perimeter defenses suppress attacks only by over-refusing 54-92% of legitimate work, so a low attack-success rate can conceal severe over-refusal. As a reference defense, we propose a calibrated Meta-Auditor pairing synchronous state checks with asynchronous trajectory monitoring; on a family-disjoint 906-scenario held-out split it reaches 98.5% recall at a 2.9% false-positive rate. Since it monitors trajectory, not surface content, its detection is channel-invariant: the strongest auditor flags image-delivered attacks about as reliably as their text equivalents (recall gap ≤\leq2 points per model). Across GPT, Gemini, and Claude auditors, calibration keeps false positives low while recall tracks model capability, strongest for Claude.

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