There is a well-established body of work demonstrating that individual machine learning (ML) algorithms can be manipulated or deceived. However, in many real-world systems, multiple ML algorithms are composed to enable automated decision-making, particularly in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Often such systems use a composition of vision, planning, and other ML models to affect their internal state and ultimate take actions in the physical world. While there is a huge literature on the (in)security of ML algorithms, it is not immediately clear how an attacker might leverage their ability to trick individual learners when attacking the composition as a whole. We develop methods for creating an attack policy (a mapping from state to attack) for a data-manipulating attacker affecting a CPS or other state-machine-based AI compositions. We describe our framework, a basic threat model and corresponding methods for computing an optimal attack policy, as well as planned extensions. The goal of this work-in-progress paper is to stimulate conversation and forge new collaborations regarding the security of compositional learning.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Self Driving Car Example. The Stopped (S) state represents the car stopped, awaiting instruction. The Accelerating (A) state represents a car that is increasing its velocity. When moving at the desired speed in the desired lane with no perceived obstacles, the car is in the Lane Keeping (LK) state. The Decelerating (D) and Passing (PS) states represent reactive maneuvers to environmental hazards, while Parking (PK) represents a transition to a terminal safety state. In our example, the attacker’s objective is to reach the target state s†=S ; the optimal adversarial policy shifts between exploiting the D or PS pathways depending on the defender’s transition probabilities, defined by the parameters αs,s′ (transition probability from state s to state s′ ). For figure clarity we have removed the self-loops of every state, representing the fact that the car may remain in a state across multiple time steps.
Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.
RoÝah Radaideh, Ali Khreis
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
We consider the problem of learning-based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS), and extend our previously proposed Bellman Deviation Detection (BDD) framework for model-free reinforcement learning (RL). We refine the standard MDP attack model by allowing the reward function to depend on both the current and subsequent states, thereby capturing reward variations induced by errors in the adversary's transition estimate. We also derive an optimal system-identification strategy for the adversary that minimizes detectable value deviations. Further, we prove that the agent's asymptotic learning time required to secure the system scales linearly with the adversary's learning time, and that this matches the optimal lower bound. Hence, the proposed detection scheme is order-optimal in detection efficiency. Finally, we extend the framework to asynchronous and intermittent attack scenarios, where reliable detection is preserved.
AI-enabled Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are highly vulnerable to adversarial and anomalous inputs, where small perturbations can induce cascading errors and unsafe control actions. Existing approaches, such as rule-based filtering, training-time regularization, or diffusion-based reconstruction, either operate outside the model or lack mechanisms to incorporate formal security specifications into the prediction process. In this paper, we take the first step toward embedding security properties directly into AI-enabled CPS, enabling predictive models to enforce system-level constraints during inference rather than relying on external defenses. We introduce a logic-conditioned bi-stage diffusion framework that integrates Signal Temporal Logic (STL) specifications into forecasting. STL serves as a first-class conditioning signal that guides both an input repair stage and an output refinement stage, allowing the model to jointly mitigate adversarial perturbations and enforce desired temporal behaviors to satisfy security-critical properties. We evaluate our approach on two real-world multivariate CPS forecasting datasets under a diverse set of physical sensor and cyber attacks. Across sensor faults, gradient-based attacks, adaptive attacks, and varying attack strengths, our method consistently improves robustness and specification compliance, degrades more gracefully as attack strength increases, and generalizes better to unseen attacks. Ablation studies on specification coverage and quality further show that embedding logical security properties yields gains unattainable by reconstruction-based methods alone, highlighting a new direction for integrating formal methods with generative models in secure CPS.
Ziyan An, John Stankovic, Meiyi Ma
Department of Computer Science Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN · Department of Computer Science University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA