cs.AINov 8, 2026

Optimizing Multi-Tier Intermediation in Programmatic Advertising: A DAG-Based Mechanism for Supply Path Optimization

Authors: Amelia Bădică, Costin Bădică

Organizations: University of Craiova, Romania

Abstract

Digital programmatic advertising operates through complex, multi-hop supply chains. The opacity of these intermediary networks leads to significant efficiency losses, often referred to as the ``ad-tech tax.'' While current industry practices utilize heuristic Supply Path Optimization (SPO) to trim inefficient routes, they fail to optimize the equilibrium of the entire network. This paper extends previous work on Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) intermediation models by applying them to traceable programmatic supply chains mapped via the OpenRTB SupplyChain object. We introduce multi-attribute utility functions and Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to account for substitutable routing (OR nodes) and percentage-based fee structures. Furthermore, we outline a computational methodology and experimental framework using public schain and sellers.json data to benchmark optimal Nash social welfare against current uncoordinated market outcomes.

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