cs.MANov 9, 2026

Steering Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Information Networks

Authors: Sepehr Ilami, Babak Heydari

Organizations: Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA · Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate in groups, each pursuing an individual objective while jointly determining system performance. If an operator controls which agent observes which other agent, but not their payoffs or messages, how should observations be structured to raise collective welfare? We make the information network (who observes whom) a design object, decoupled from the fixed interaction network over which agents act. Ten identical LLM agents play repeated group-decision games; by default each observes only an anonymous summary of the group's previous-round outcome, and a manager with a fixed budget adds directed observation links that reveal peers' past actions. Across 1,080 episodes and six games spanning coordination, anti-coordination, social dilemmas, and discovery, we ask how much information to share and, at a fixed budget, who should observe whom. Disclosure creates behavioral coupling: observation acts as a contagion channel whose welfare effect depends on the alignment between individually attractive behavior and the collective objective. First, the value of information is alignment-contingent: more peer information tends to help or be neutral when individual behavior is aligned with the collective goal, but under free-riding or congestion externalities it amplifies collectively harmful behavior; in a public-goods game the group does best with no information at all. We read this sign separation as a cross-game regularity within one controlled LLM population, not a model-invariant law. Second, at a fixed budget, who observes whom matters primarily when coupling is harmful: a modular "barbell" that lets sub-populations entrench harmful behavior is reliably the worst wiring, reversing the network-reciprocity intuition from human evolutionary game theory. These results argue against a default of full transparency for agent collectives.

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