cs.LGNov 11, 2026

Stealthy, High-Impact False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid Using Physics-Constrained GAN with Limited System Knowledge

Authors: Md. Mainul Islam, Hasan Kurban, Abdulrahman Takiddin, Muhammad Ismail, Rachad Atat, Erchin Serpedin

Organizations: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA · College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32310, USA · Cybersecurity Education, Research, and Outreach Center and the Department of Computer Science, Tennessee Tech University, Cookeville, TN 38505, USA · 

Abstract

False data injection (FDI) attacks can distort power system state estimation while retaining plausible measurement patterns. Existing FDI methods trade stealth for impact or vice versa. They often assume access to internal grids, all-bus sensing, or defender models. In this paper, we propose a detector-agnostic physics-constrained generative adversarial network (PCGAN) that learns decoupled power-flow sensitivities from historical measurements of deployed sensors. The learned active-power-angle and reactive-power-voltage-magnitude relationships guide perturbations restricted to compromised channels, while adversarial training promotes realistic spatiotemporal patterns. We implement PCGAN and seven existing FDI attacks on the IEEE 300-bus system using one year of observed hourly demand from PJM Interconnection, a regional transmission organization in the United States, and synthetic bus-level load profiles. We compare their performance across 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% compromised sensors. Attack stealth is assessed against ten machine-learning (ML) detectors and conventional bad-data detection (BDD) methods, while physical impact is quantified through nonlinear alternating-current weighted least-squares state estimation. PCGAN achieves 84.28% mean ML evasion and 22.31% mean spatial load misperception across the four scenarios. Its mean stealth-impact trade-off score reaches 18.69%, compared with 5.61% for the strongest competing attack. PCGAN also achieves 83.45% chi-square BDD evasion and 86.02% largest-normalized-residual BDD evasion. These results demonstrate a favorable stealth-impact balance under varying sensor-access levels and provide challenging attack cases for evaluating FDI detectors.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

May 15, 2026

GenAI-FDIA: Physics-Informed Generative Models for False Data Injection Attacks

Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex distributional structures imposed by network physics. We present GenAI-FDIA, a framework benchmarking a pool of P=20P{=}20 architectures for physics-compliant FDIA synthesis, spanning Wasserstein GANs, MMD-VAEs, normalising flows, diffusion models, and cross-family hybrids. These are evaluated across three IEEE testbeds (14-bus DC, 30-bus DC, and 14-bus AC) under a 60/20/20 chronological split using data-driven Bad Data Detection (BDD) threshold calibration. Our empirical results verify that these models generate high-fidelity attacks, with all architectures achieving evasion rates of εBDD≥86.6%ε_{\text{BDD}} \ge 86.6\% on the 14-bus network; additionally, limiting an attacker's topological knowledge induces a measurable degradation in stealthiness (p≤0.0022p \le 0.0022). Crucially, we identify a previously unreported failure mode: applying affine physics projections directly in normalised feature spaces critically displaces the attack vector, collapsing BDD evasion from ∼55%{\sim}55\% to < ⁣2%<\!2\% on the 30-bus testbed. We resolve this via a novel inference-time harmoniser, restoring full stealthiness (εBDD=100%ε_{\text{BDD}}{=}100\%) across all physics-informed variants without retraining. Finally, we isolate a covariance-collapse phenomenon (κ≈−0.076κ\approx {-}0.076) within advanced hybrid architectures and rectify it through 50-epoch warm-up schedules (κ→0.785κ\to 0.785, ΔMMD=−3.1%Δ\text{MMD}={-}3.1\%). Ultimately, GenAI-FDIA delivers a robust recovery blueprint applicable to any physics-constrained generative model deployed for power-system security.
Jun 7, 2026

Physically Consistent Null Space Alignment for Detection of Low-Magnitude False Data Injection Attacks

False data injection attacks (FDIAs) introducing small measurement perturbations can still cause large deviations in power system state estimation when the injected signals align with the pseudo-null space of the system model. Existing model- and data-driven detectors may fail to identify such low-magnitude but high-impact attacks because residual tests ignore changes hidden in the pseudo-null space, while subspace learning methods capture correlation patterns without enforcing physical consistency. This paper proposes Physically Consistent Null Space Alignment (PCNSA), a framework that detects stealthy FDIAs by preserving, through preprocessing, the geometric correspondence between the physical null space and the measurement-derived pseudo-null space. The key point is a Pseudo-null Space Conserved data Preprocessing (PSCP) step that re-expresses measurements in the physical coordinate frame before subspace extraction. We prove that PSCP preserves the separation between row space and its orthogonal complement, a property that conventional per-feature standardization violates. This keeps the singular value decomposition (SVD)-derived pseudo-null subspace aligned with the physical residual space without explicit knowledge of H. Experiments on IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems confirm this principle in practice: stealthy attacks that evade XTM, LSTM, AE and Isolation Forest baselines appear as clear deviations in the aligned subspace, yielding higher F1-score and detection accuracy while remaining robust under partial observability and realistic PMU noise.
Apr 3, 2026

Learning Without Adversarial Training: A Physics-Informed Neural Network for Secure Power System State Estimation under False Data Injection Attacks

Power System State Estimation (PSSE) converts geographically distributed measurements into the voltage magnitudes and phase angles needed for grid monitoring and control. Learned estimators can perform this mapping rapidly, but model-aware False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) may corrupt their inputs while retaining AC plausibility and residual-based stealth. Physics-Informed Neural Networks (PINNs) limit candidate states through power-flow consistency; however, their robustness depends on balancing supervised and physics losses whose scales and gradient contributions evolve during training. This paper proposes a PINN that jointly learns homoscedastic uncertainty parameters and uses them to adapt the two objectives. The formulation assigns trainable log-uncertainties to the active-power, reactive-power, voltage, and angle losses while safeguarding against an underweighted physics objective. The estimator is trained only on clean steady-state data and is evaluated, without adversarial retraining, under baseline state-distortion and stricter residual-profile-matching regimes on the IEEE~118-bus system. Accuracy is measured against the uncompromised system state. Relative to a fixed-weight PINN, dynamic weighting reduces overall Mean Absolute Error (MAE) by 55%55\% while also improving voltage- and angle-estimation accuracy. The results show that learning the physics/data balance from clean data improves robustness to unseen FDIAs.